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REFLECTIONS ON V A W A'S STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: 
THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE BATTERED 
IMMIGRANT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Alizabeth Newman* 
"[T]his is our failure and our challenge for the twenty-first 
century: to reclaim a movement, to reform a vision, and to resituate 
ourselves within a feminist politic that refuses to sacrifice women's 
experience and autonomy to the prerogatives of the state."} 
INTRODUCTION 
During the same two decades in which immigrants in the U.S. have 
seen their rights and options severely diminished, a small subset of 
immigrant victims of domestic abuse and other crimes received 
heightened attention and have continued to benefit from strengthened 
and widening pathways to legal immigration status.2 Since 1996 
Congress has passed a series of monumentally restrictive legislative 
changes, significantly altering the immigration system as we knew it. 3 
Established concepts in immigration law from "entry" and 
"lawfulness" were revamped, making it increasingly difficult for 
newcomers to arrive or others to remain within U.S. borders.4 Those 
seeking safe haven in the U.S. faced stringent regulations and 
applicants for immigration status with even minor criminal 
convictions confronted unforgiving penalties.s For over a decade, 
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G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the 
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agenda,6 but all attempts at passing either comprehensive or 
piecemeal legislation failed, revealing little political will for reform.7 
Only recently after the 2013 elections has there been a renewed 
energy toward reform with viable, bipartisan proposals in play in 
both congressional houses.8 Yet in the midst of the downward spiral 
from 1996 to present, thousands of immigrant survivors of domestic 
violence have found safety and independence from their abusers 
through legalization exemptions created by the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA) and its reauthorizations.9 
Strategic choices within the women's rights movement to partner 
with law enforcement made these advances possible. As was the case 
of the battered women's movement in the 1960s and 1970s,1O battered 
immigrant women benefited substantially from this partnership but at 
the same time, sacrificed some key movement goals. II A 
conservative, law enforcement framing of the law has led to a sharp 
deviation from the fundamental principles of the battered women's 
movement in terms of defining which battered women can secure 
relief, and in the degree of agency they are afforded in the process. 12 
The focus in the more recent V A W A provisions for immigrant 
women has strayed from the initial political and social message that 
no woman should be trapped in an abusive home, and has returned to 
archaic conceptions of domestic abuse that demand deserving victims 
and dependence in order to access relief. 13 The contentious debates 
6. See infra Part II. 
7. Ashley Parker, On Immigration, Obama Draws Bipartisan Praise, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
14,2013. 
8. Julia Preston, Obama Will Seek Citizenship Path in One Fast Push, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
13, 2013, at AI; Julia Preston, Republicans Reconsider Positions on Immigration, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2012, at A 12; Rosalind Helderman & Sean Sullivan, Bipartisan 
Group Of Senators To Unveil Framework For Immigration Overhaul, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 28, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.coml20 13-0 1-28/politics/ 
36583603 _1_illegal-immigrants-immigration-laws-immigration-system; Julia Preston, 
Showing Grassroots Support for Immigration Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2012, at 
All. 
9. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) 
[hereinafter V A W A 1994]; Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) [hereinafter VTVPA]; Violence 
Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006) [hereinafter VA WA 2005]; see infra Part II. 
10. See SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES 
OFTHE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 157-61 (1982). 
II. See infra Parts III, IV.A.2. 
12. See infra Part IV. 
13. See infra Part IV.B. 
2013] Reflections on VAWA's Strange Bedfellows 231 
over the recent 2013 VAWA Reauthorization split the issues directly 
along party lines. 14 
This article adds to the wealth of retrospective examinations of the 
early women's movement choices to partner with law enforcement by 
extending that reflection to the parallel course charted by battered 
immigrant women. The analysis of the history of VA W A and its 
progeny studies an anomaly of emerging protections for some 
immigrants amid the storm of restrictive immigration revisions for 
the majority. Part I provides background to the article with an 
overview of the erosion of rights in the immigration schema since the 
1990s. Part II describes the exceptional tools VA WA made available 
to immigrant survivors of domestic violence during that same 
timeframe. Part III compares the controversial choices made first by 
the women's movement with those of the battered immigrant 
women's advocates to create alliances with law enforcement. Each 
group overcame deep concerns to strategically partner with the power 
of the state for specific gains. 15 
Part IV probes the unintended consequences of these partnerships. 
In achieving their goals, each group of advocates compromised some 
of the core movement values. 16 Commendably more legislative 
pathways to legal status were created for immigrant survivors of 
domestic violence, however, many requirements to access status are 
anathema to the movement's feminist roots.17 This section examines 
the substance of the law in its definition of the survivor/victim and in 
the level of dependence demanded to utilize the law. Part V 
concludes the article with an invitation for advocates and lawyers to 
rise to the challenge posed above by Professor Miccio to engage 
together in reflective conversations as we proceed in this work, with 
the hope of reclaiming the foundational principles of the women's 
movement. 
14. Times Topics, Violence Against Women Act, N.Y. TIMES, 
http:! itopics.nytimes.com/topireferenceitimestopics/subjectsid/domestic _ violenceiinde 
x.html (last visited Feb. 18,2013). 
15. See infra Part III. 
16. See i1ifra Part N. 
17. See i1ifra Part N. 
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1. REDUCTION OF IMMIGRATION PATHWAYS IN THE 1990s 
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A. Restrictive Legislative Changes 
In 1996 long-established constructs of immigration were upset by 
two major pieces of legislation, the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (lIRAIRA) and the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).'8 "Deportation,,'9 ceased to 
exist and the more sanitized term "removal" was created.20 The 
concept of due process was also re-envisioned. From as far back as 
the Chinese Exclusion Ace' in the 1880s, the U.S. immigration 
system acknowledged some level of rights to a non-citizen upon 
entry. 22 This premise was overturned with IIRAIRA/3 now granting 
a basic level of rights only upon a legal "admission.,,24 The 
controversial classification "aggravated felony,,25 was introduced to 
bar immigrants with serious criminal convictions for crimes 
involving moral turpitude/6 which at one point had been interpreted 
18. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18,22,28, and 42 
U.S.C.) and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208. 
19. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587-90 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.c. § 1229a(b)(5) (2006)) (stating prior to 1996, deportation was the 
term used by the U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration 
Review (EOIR) to demand an immigrant leave the United States). 
20. Congress enacted Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 101(a)(47) in 1996 
in section 440(b) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1277 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ IIOl(a)(47)(A) (2006)). A year later, through the enactment ofIIRAIRA, Congress 
created removal proceedings with resulting removal orders. Pub. L. 104-208, 
§ 240(b)(5), 110 Stat. at 3009-546,3009-589-90 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § I 229a(b)(5)). 
IIRAIRA section 309( d)(2) provided that references to orders of removal are deemed 
to include references to orders of deportation. Accordingly, INA section IOI(a)(47) 
applies to orders of removal. 
21. See Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126,22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943). 
22. See 8 U.S.C. § I IOI(a)(13) (1994) (entry vs. exclusion), amended by IIRAIRA § 301; 
8 U.S.C §§ 1222-26 (outlining procedures for exclusion), amended by IIRAIRA 
§ 308. 
23. See IIRAIRA, 110 Stat. 3009-546-724 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 110 I). 
24. IIRAIRA § 301(a), 8 U.S.c. § I 101 (a)(\3) (2006). 
25. Id. § 32 I (a), 8 U.S.c. § I \0 I (a)(43). 
26. rNA § 212(a)(2)(a)(i), 8 U.S.C. § I I 82(a)(2)(a)(i), INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006) (making deportable any legal permanent resident who, 
within the first 5 years of gaining status, is convicted of even one crime involving 
moral turpitude (CIMT) for which potential sentence is one year or more). 
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so widely as to include jumping a New York City tumstile.27 
Remaining in the U.S. without permission became codified as 
"unlawful presence,,28 that could bar access to immigration status. 29 
Detention became mandatory for those arriving without authorization 
at ports of entry/o even for political asylum seekers escaping 
persecution.31 These laws were initially deemed retroactive.32 
The first of the harsh bills was AEDP A/3 ironically justified by a 
U.S. citizen's bombing of the Oklahoma federal building.34 This 
bill's most shocking clause was one to suspend for immigrants the 
writ of habeas corpus, the most fundamental protection of the 
individual from unjustified governmental infringement of liberty. 35 
Constitutional challenges to this suspension re-affirmed the import of 
27. A class A misdemeanor in New York can be punishable for up to one year. N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 165.15 (McKinney 2010). An aggravated felony includes a theft 
offense or a burglary offense plus a sentence of imprisonment of at least one year. 
INA §237(a)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). While turnstile jumping has been 
determined not to be an aggravated felony, it is a deportable offense if committed 
within 5 years of obtaining legal permanent resident status, as a "crime involving 
moral turpitude" that carries a potential sentence of at least one year. INA 
§237(a)(2)(A)(i); 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). 
28. See IIRAlRA § 301(b)(1) (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) 
(2006)) (applying unlawful presence "if the alien is present in the United States after 
the expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General or is present in 
the United States without being admitted or paroled"). 
29. INA § 212(a)(9)(B), 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(9)(B)(i) (triggering a 3 or 10 year bar for 
those unlawfully present for more than 180 or 365 days respectively). 
30. INA § 241 (a)(2), 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(2) (requiring mandatory detention during the 
removal period). 
3l. See id. § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), 302(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)) 
and § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (permitting applicant's 
release from detention only after passing a credible fear interview). 
32. See IIRAIRA § 301(a), 8 U.S.c. § I 101 (a); In re Collado-Munoz, 21 I. & N. Dec. 
1061, 1063-64 (B.I.A. 1998). 
33. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18,22,28, and 42 
U.S.c.). 
34. See Rabea Chaudhry, Effective Advocacy in a Time of Terror: Redefining the Legal 
Representation of a Suspected Terrorist Facing Secret Evidence, 8 UCLA J. ISLAMIC 
& NEAR E.L. 10 I, 114 (2009) (noting that the reaction to create more stringent 
immigration laws ignored the fact that the violence was executed by a native-born 
U.S. citizen). 
35. See AEDPA § 104(1)-(3) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.c. § 2254(b)(1)-(3)). But 
cf Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996 
Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509,2524-25 (1998) (detailing the tradition of 
common law courts to exercise a broad scope of review where confinement presented 
a threat to one's right to liberty). 
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the writ for citizens and non-citizens alike.36 Equally caustic were the 
provisions of mandatory detention of legal permanent residents 
convicted of a wide range of criminal offenses, including 
shoplifting37 or minor drug offenses.38 The Supreme Court validated 
the use of mandatory detention,39 but limited the indefinite detention 
provisions.40 
Within another six months, Congress passed even more sweeping 
legislation, lIRAIRA.41 Whereas a non-citizen without proper 
immigration documents may have previously been unable to obtain 
legal working papers and may have been vulnerable to deportation, 
lIRAIRA first created the concept of "unlawful presence" that could 
permanently obstruct the legalization process.42 This bill erased any 
sense of security that legal permanent residents had enjoyed by 
mandating that a return to the U.S. after travel could under certain 
circumstances be considered as seeking new admission to the 
country,43 and by enacting retroactive changes to the types of crimes 
that could cause a legal permanent resident to lose legal status and 
face removal.44 lIRAIRA also built on AEDPA's expansion of the 
list of crimes that would trigger mandatory detention.45 Further, 
lIRAIRA substantially limited federal judicial review of immigration 
cases, stripping the courts of jurisdiction for any discretionary 
36. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 290 (2001). 
37. See INA § 2l2(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.c. § 1 1 82(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006); INA 
§ 2l2(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 82(a)(2)(A)(ii) (providing an exception for just one 
offense); See generally St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 294-98 (describing the erosion, as a result 
of AEDP A and IIRAIRA, of the rights held by permanent-resident aliens to apply for 
a discretionary deportation waiver). 
38. INA § 2l2(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 82(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Any conviction or admission 
of a controlled substance violation (as defined in section 802 of title 21) is a ground 
for inadmissibility. See also id. § 2l2(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (stating the only 
exception is for possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana). 
39. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003) (ruling that the mandatory detention 
provision ofIIRAIRA was constitutional). 
40. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001), the Court examined the detention of 
lawful permanent residents under final deportation orders. It held that "[0 ]nce 
removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer 
authorized." Id. at 699. In Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005), the Court 
held that the same analysis must be applied to inadmissible noncitizens as well as to 
noncitizens who are removable. ._ 
41. See IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of8 U.S.C.). 
42. See IIRAIRA § 30l(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 82(a)(9)(8). 
43. See id. § 30l(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 10 1 (a)(13), (a)(27)(A). 
44. See id. § 304, 8 U.S.c. § l229a. 
45. See id. § 321, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101 (a)( 43) (amending the definition of aggravated felony). 
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decisions.46 Lastly, IIRAIRA created a climate of fear in immigrant 
communities through the encouragement of agreements between 
localities and the federal government to cooperate in immigration 
enforcement. 47 
In the aftermath of the September 11, 200 I attacks, Congress 
reacted again to further impede immigration by closing the main legal 
artery for undocumented immigrants being sponsored by family 
members or employers to legalize their immigration status.48 In 
eliminating use of a special payment structure previously available to 
forgive prior immigration violations,49 Congress blocked the 
legalization path for over a million family members of U.S. citizens 
and legal permanent residents. 50 
By 2003, the entire administrative scheme governing immigration 
was restructured, breaking up the former Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) under the Department of Justice into 
three separate agencies under the new Department of Homeland 
Security.51 To the extent that these titles described the national 
posture toward immigration, the vision of the institution shifted from 
one of service to newcomers (the Immigration and Naturalization 
46. Id. § 303(a), 8 U.S.C. § I 226(e). 
47. See id. § 133, 8 U.S.c. § 1357(g) (resulting in profound disagreement throughout 
mixed status communities and police localities, which fear the consequences of the 
loss of trust between local police and vulnerable populations). 
48. See MARc R. ROSENBLUM, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY SINCE 9111: UNDERSTANDING 
THE STALEMATE OVER COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM 6-8 (2011). 
49. INA, Pub. L. No. 103-317, § 245(i), 108 Stat. 1765-66 (1994), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(i) 
(2006) was an experimental provision that allowed non-citizens who had fallen out of 
status or those who never obtained documents to move forward with paths to family 
or employment-based immigration, paying a super-fee of $1,000 to have their 
immigration infractions waived. Without this provision, most undocumented 
immigrants were unable to obtain status. They could not legalize in the United States 
and if they were to leave the country voluntarily, even to attend their consular 
interview, sanctions were imposed for three or ten years. See INA § 212(a)(9)(B), 8 
U.S.c. § I I 82(a)(9)(B) (2006). 
50. Ted Hesson, New Immigration Process Will Keep Families Together, ABC NEWS 
(Jan. 3,2013,5:31 PM), http://abcnews.go.comlmlstory?id=18116673 (referring to a 
temporary fix crafted by the Obama Administration to overcome the effects of the 
unlawful presence bars). 
5l. DHS was created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 
Stat. 2135 on November 25,2002. It merged the legacy INS into DHS as of March I, 
2003, creating U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (lCE), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 
3A AM. JUR. 20 Aliens and Citizens § 33 (2005). 
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Service), to the defensive management of an inherent potential threat 
to the county (Department of Homeland Security).52 
Next, the Justice Department cut the number of members sitting on 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and encouraged rubber-
stamping of Immigration Judges' decisions by permitting 
"affirmation without decision.,,53 The federal appellate court backlog 
grew untenable with immigrants seeking meaningful judicial review 
that they could no longer find at the BIA.54 The huge rise in the 
number of immigration appeals continues to plague the federal 
system. 55 Ongoing constitutional challenges attempt to push back on 
many of these provisions with mixed results. 56 
B. Criminalization of Immigrants 
Immigration violations have always been civil, not criminal, in 
nature. 57 Thus, there is no right to counsel in immigration 
proceedings despite the grave deprivations of liberty such as 
indefinite detention, loss of one's home, job, and family, or virtual 
52. The primary missions of DHS are preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, 
reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimizing the 
damage from potential attacks and natural disasters. Our Mission: Homeland 
Security, HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/our-mission (last visited Jan. 11, 
2013). In contrast, the former INS was charged with implementation of laws of 
naturalizing, admitting, rejecting, and processing all immigrants seeking entry to the 
United States, and policing and expelling those who entered or remained without 
permission. 1891 Immigration Act, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084-86. Even the 
language "homeland" raises ethnic nationalist ideals, calling forth images of Nazi 
Germany. 
53. See generally Martin S. Krezalek, How to Minimize the Risk o/Violating Due Process 
Rights While Preserving the BIA's Ability to Affirm Without Opinion, 21 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.1. 277,279,288,296,314 (2007). 
54. See, e.g., OFFICE OF PLANNING AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE 
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2004 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK B5 fig.2 (2005), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy04syb.pdf (showing immigration 
cases from fiscal years 2000-2004). 
55. As of July 31,2012, there are currently 320,331 pending immigration cases on the 
federal docket. Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRACIMMIGRA TION (July 31, 
2012), http://trac.syr.edulphptools/immigrationlcourt _backlog!. 
56. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 
(2003); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 
297-98 (200 I). 
57. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 
342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585,591 (1913); Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893). 
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exile from a long-established life in the United States.58 In 2010, the 
U.S. Supreme Court clarified that given the severity of the 
consequences to an immigrant of a criminal conviction, a defense 
attorney has an affirmative duty to advise about the immigration 
implications of plea bargains.59 A breach of this duty can serve as the 
basis for vacating an agreement.60 
More and more, public opinion has equated undocumented 
immigrants with criminals. The construct of "unlawful presence," 
while not a crime, gave fuel to anti-immigrant groups insistent on 
publically categorizing immigrants with no status as "illegals.,,61 
Bill Gng Ring describes a calculated campaign to criminalize 
immigrants as an instrument of control. 62 The process begins by 
dehumanizing the immigrant.63 "[T]hen she is demonized and 
labeled a problem," and finally, Hing argues, is "further dehumanized 
until at last her actions or conditions are criminalized."64 In reality, 
this dehumanization begins with the very labeling of immigrants in 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as "aliens," connoting 
"other" or "foreign," and fostering fear.65 Popular media aids this 
58. See, e.g., Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideonfrom the Dynamics of 
Social Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L REV. 697, 700 (2006) (arguing that there 
should be a civil right to counsel); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478, 1480 
(2010). The Padilla decision was a breakthrough in acknowledging the severity of the 
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction, previously dismissed as 
collateral. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478, 1480. 
59. Padilla, at 1483, 1486 (holding that a criminal defense attorney must advise non-
citizen clients about the deportation risks of a guilty plea, advising if a conviction 
"may" or will have immigration consequences); see also Chaidez v. United States, 
113 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (clarifying that Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases 
already final on direct review). 
60. Id. at 1482-83. 
61. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L REv. 
2037,2044 (2008) (observing that "some advocates start-and end-their arguments 
by pointing out that some noncitizens are 'illegal aliens,'" an "unforgiving approach 
to unlawful immigration find[ing] broad resonance in a post-9111 climate," while 
others consider "unlawful presence ... [as] merely a formal status that overlooks 
contributions made to U.S. society and ties acquired ... [in U.S.] with government 
acquiescence," prefer the term '''undocumented'''). 
62. Bill Ong Hing, Understanding SBI070 from the Lens of Institutionalized Racism and 
Civil Rights, THE RACE EQUITY PROJECT, LEGAL SERVS. OF N. CAL., 
http://equity.lsnc.netlunderstanding -sb I 070-from-the-Iens-of-institutionalized-racism-
and-civil-rights/#_ftnI5 (last visited Jan. 11,2013). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. See INA § 101(a)(3), (15), 8 U.S.c. § 1 101 (a)(3), (15) (2006) (defining the terms 
alien and immigrant). 
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effort, playing on common fears. 66 While statistically immigrants 
commit crimes at a rate half of U.S. citizens, media stories abound, 
sensationalizing incidents in which undocumented men commit 
violent crimes.67 Concurrently, refurbished regulations under the new 
Department of Homeland Security, the Secret Service, and Federal 
Emergency Management send a clear message that immigrants 
represent a threat that must be controlled.68 
In fact, over the last decade immigration authorities have found 
ways to criminalize unauthorized immigrants for entering or simply 
existing in the U.S. Prior to the 1990s, border agents managed cases 
of those caught crossing the border by processing a voluntary return 
or a civil violation. This policy changed radically in 2005 with the 
Bush administration's Operation Streamline that removed discretion 
and mandated criminal prosecution.69 First-time offenders were 
charged with misdemeanor illegal entry, while those with prior 
deportations, felony illegal reentry.70 Laborers working under false 
social security numbers were arraigned with federal crimes ranging 
from false identification to being found in the U.S. after removal. 71 
The very act of immigrating and participating in the natural flow of 
labor following capital, became criminal. 72 The phenomenon of 
criminalization, however, is neither new nor unique to the U.S., but 
represents a global trend. 73 Some have concluded it to be both the 
66. Datrid L. Altheide, The Mass Media, Crime and Terrorism, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 982, 
982-997 (2006). 
67. See Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, Crime, Corrections, and California: 
What Does Immigration have to do with It? in 9 California Counts: Population Trends 
and Profiles at 2, 7-9 (pub. Policy Ins. of Cal. Ed., 2008), available at 
http://www.ppic.orgicontentJpubslcacounts/CC_208KBCC.pdf (finding that 
immigrants are about half as likely to become involved in crime). 
68. See Noel L. Griswold, Note, Forgetting the Melting Pot: An Analysis of the 
Department of Homeland Security Takeover of the INS, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 207, 
208-10,221-22,224-25,227,229-31 (2005) (arguing that when the Department of 
Homeland Security was created, immigration began to be treated less as a benefit to 
the economy and more as a threat to national security). 
69. See Joanna Jacobbi Lyndgate, Assembly-line Justice: A Review of Operation 
Streamline, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 481, 482-84 (2010). 
70. Id. at 484. 
71. See Ira J. Kurzban, Criminalizing Immigration Law, in 42ND ANNUAL IMMIGRATION 
AND NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE 321, 326-27 (2009). 
72. See id. at 326-27; DAVID BACON, ILLEGAL PEOPLE: How GLOBALIZATION CREATES 
MIGRATION AND CRlMINALlZES IMMIGRANTS 5 (2008). 
73. See BACON, supra note 72, at 71-73, 75. United States and European systems have 
never acknowledged legitimacy to social or economic rights. Id. at 74-77, 80-81. As 
our political and economic systems grow increasingly globalized, they create illegality 
by displacing people and then denying them rights or equality as they adapt to the 
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'''productive' and the 'intended' consequence[] of state policies of 
social control," endemic to the neoliberal agenda.74 
II. VITAL EXPANSION OF BENEFITS FOR IMMIGRANT 
SURVIVORS OF ABUSE SINCE THE 1990s 
During the same time period, the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA) of 199475 was passed as a result of a massive, coordinated 
effort by advocates to secure protection for survivors of domestic 
abuse, including immigrant survivors. 76 Law enforcement was 
enlisted to improve criminal justice and community-based responses 
to domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking in 
the United States.77 The initial purpose of V A W A was "to deter and 
punish violent crimes against women" by providing law enforcement 
with additional tools to combat domestic violence, and by making it 
easier for victims to come forward. 78 Importantly, included in the Act 
was Subtitle G, Protections for Battered Immigrant Women and 
Children, the fIrst substantial legislation addressing the plight of 
immigrant women suffering from domestic abuse.79 Within a mixed-
status marriage, an abusive United States citizen or legal permanent 
resident had complete control of his immigrant spouse's immigration 
status, and thus her ability to work to support herself and her 
children, to travel, and to access most public benefIts. 80 The abused 
spouse would commonly fear that seeking help could instead lead to 
her arrest, deportation, and separation from her children. 81 V A W A 
economic fluctuations and follow the labor demand in order to survive. ld. at 23, 70, 
74-77,80-81. 
74. See KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE: How NEOLIBERALISM APPROPRIATED 
THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE 11-12 (2008) (proffering that 
when this trend examined in the historical and cultural context, it cannot be dismissed 
as unintended consequences). 
75. Enacted as Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13701 
(2006». 
76. Violence Against Women Act, H.R. REp. No. 103-395, at 25 (1993). 
77. VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40121, 108 Stat. at 1910-11. 
78. Violence Against Women Act, H.R. REp. No. 103-395, at 25. 
79. VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701, 108 Stat. at 1953 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1154(a) (2006». Note that while passed under the VAWA, the language of 
the provisions are gender neutral. Given that the vast majority of abuse in domestic 
relationships is perpetrated by men against women, this article will continue to refer to 
survivors as women, recognizing that men can also be victimized by the same abuses 
of power. 
80. Violence Against Women Act, H.R. REp. No. 103-395, at 26. 
81. ld. 
240 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
Subtitle G publically recognized that immigration laws had been 
manipulated as a tool for abuse and control of immigrant women.82 
The bill introduced the construct of self-petitioning for immigration 
status: a process that enabled an abused immigrant to manage the 
legalization process herself, independent from the control of the 
abusive U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident spouseY A similar 
process was crafted for those in deportation or removal proceedings.84 
These early VA W A provisions did not create new pathways for 
battered immigrant women to legalize. 85 Rather, they modified the 
existing systems-family petitioning or cancellation of removal-
which would normally benefit a non-citizen married to a U.S. citizen 
or legal permanent resident. 86 The difference was that the general 
immigration provisions afforded full dominion to the petitioning 
citizen or legal resident to initiate or complete the process. 87 The 
VA W A provisions removed that power from the abuser and returned 
a battered immigrant woman to the legal posture she would have held 
in the immigration process based on her marriage, absent the abuse.88 
In the debates preceding IIRAIRA, a number of senators voiced 
their awareness of the adverse consequences to immigrant survivors 
of immigration enforcement, which could be exploited by an abuser 
to silence a victim.89 Among them, Senator Wells tone asserted that 
82. Congress recognized that "[m]any immigrant women live trapped and isolated in 
violent homes, afraid to tum to anyone for help. They fear both continued abuse if 
they stay with their batterers and deportation if they attempt to leave." Id. 
83. SeeVAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701(a), 108 Stat. at 1953 (codified as amended at 
INA § 204(a)(I), 8 U.S.c. § 1154(a)(1 )(A)-(D) (2006)). 
84. See IlRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546,3009-594 (codified 
at 8 U.S.c. § 1229(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006)). 
85. SeeVAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701(a), 108 Stat. at 1953. 
86. See id.; IIRAIRA, § 304(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-594 (codified at 8 U.S.c. 
§ 1229b(2)(A)(i) (2006)). 
87. See 8 U.S.c. § 1154(a)(1) (1988) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(I)(A)(i)-(iii) 
(2006)). 
88. It did not advance her process, but it would transfer her priority date. See V A W A 
1994, supra note 9, § 4070 1 (a), 108 Stat. at 1953 (codified as amended at 
204(a)(I)(D), 8 U.S.C. § I I 54(a)(1)(D)(i)(III) (2006); 8 C.F.R. 204.2(h)(2)). For 
example, the category of spouses of legal permanent residents has a backlog of over 
two years. The law did not allow a battered woman to bypass this wait and move to 
the front of the line. However, if the woman left her abuser in the midst of the 
process, she would hold her place in the backlog, and would not need to begin her 
process anew. 
89. IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 384(a), 110 Stat. 3009-652 (codified as amended at 
8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)). This provision prohibited DHS from providing any information 
about the applicant to the abuser or from denying a case based solely on accusation 
from the abuser. Id. 
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"it would be unconscionable for our immigration laws to facilitate an 
abuser's control over his victim.,,90 To overcome this defect in the 
law, a specific amendment was added to shield an applicant from 
false allegations by her abuser and to safeguard confidentiality.91 
This regulation serves as a primary protection for immigrant 
survivors to safely utilize the VAWA provisions.92 
Over the next five years, advocates lobbied Congress in preparation 
for the reauthorization of VA W A in 2000, the Victims of Trafficking 
and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA).93 The issues confronted by 
battered immigrant women were again specifically addressed.94 
VTVP A 2000 perfected many of the self-petitioning provisions from 
the original act, making them more practically usefu1.95 Most 
notably, VTVP A 2000 created the V visa, a new legislative path for 
immigrant victims who could not take advantage of the 1994 
provisions.96 The V visa opened the door to immigrant victims of 
domestic abuse who were not married to V.S. citizens or legal 
permanent residents97 if they could assist law enforcement in 
90. 142 CONGo REc. 56, S4306 (1996) (statement of Sen. Paul Wellstone). 
91. IIRAlRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 384(a), 110 Stat. 3009-652 (codified as amended at 
8 U.S.c. § 1367(a». 
92. The House version of the 2013 V A W A reauthorization that was voted down 
challenged this confidentiality provision by proposing to allow input from the abuser 
to be considered as part of the adjudication process of a self-petitioning battered 
spouse. See H.R. 4970 § 801(a)(D) and (b)(4)(IV)(bb), (1 12th): Violence Against 
Women Reauthorization Act of2012, I 12th Congo (2011-2013). 
93. VTVPA, supra note 9. 
94. ld., § 1502, 114 Stat. at 1518. 
95. ld. VTVPA removed "extreme hardship" as an element of a self-petition. See id. § 
1503(b) (codified as amended at INA § 204(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)), to allow 
approved self-petitioners to adjust status in the U.S. in spite of having entered without 
inspection or having overstayed a visa. See id. § 1507(a). And it created age-out 
protections for children of self-petitioners who would turn 21 before being able to 
complete their legalization process. See id. § 1503(d). 
96. See Memorandum from William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. of Operations for Vermont 
Servo Ctr., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., on Centralization of Interim 
Relief for U Nonimmigrant Status Applicants at I (Oct. 8, 2003), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/USCISlLaws/Memoranda!Static Jiles_ 
Memoranda! Archives%20 1998-2008/2003/ucntrll 00803 .pdf (explaining that the 
VTVPA allowed immigrant victims to stay in the U.S. if they could assist law 
enforcement). 
97. See id. at 1,3 (indicating that the list requirements does not include that the victim be 
married to a U.S. citizen or be a legal permanent resident). Either a victim was not 
married to the abuser, or if she was married, her spouse did not have legal permanent 
resident or citizenship status. 
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"investigation or prosecution" of the abuser. 98 Its purpose was "to 
strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to detect, 
investigate and prosecute cases of domestic violence, sexual assault, 
trafficking of persons and other criminal activity of which aliens are 
victims, while offering protection to victims of such offenses. ,,99 
The improvements in immigration protections for battered 
immigrant women continued through the Violence Against Women 
Act and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005. 100 
Specifically, Title VIII, "Protection of Battered and Trafficked 
Immigrants," removed further obstacles for battered immigrant 
women by carving exceptions for survivors of domestic violence on 
motions to reopen old deportation or removal orders,101 expanding 
self-petitioning provisions to older children,102 to elderly parents, 103 
and to abused spouses dependent on status in other programs,104 and 
affording an immigration judge discretion in evaluating the weight of 
an applicant's criminal convictions. lOS 
The latest VAWA reauthorization in 2013 prevailed only after 
contentious negotiations that delayed the renewal for over a year, 
allowing the expiration of V A W A in 2011.106 This time the debates 
were distinct. With a more partisan congressional environment, 
advocates and sponsors are not able to focus productively on practical 
98. See VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1513 (codified as amended at INA 101, 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a» (noting that the U visa can be used for a list of enumerated crimes, including 
domestic abuse). 
99. Memorandum from William R. Yates, supra note 96, at 1. 
100. See VA WA 2005, supra note 9. 
101. See id. § 825(a) (codified as amended at INA 240(c)(7), 8 U.s.C. § 1229a(c)(7) 
(2006». 
102. See id. § 805(c) (codified as amended at INA § 204(a)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(I) 
(2006». 
103. See id. § 816. 
104. VA W A 2005 created similar self-petitioning protections for battered spouses of 
abusers who were eligible for status under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central 
American Relief Act of 1998 § 815, Cuban Adjustment Act § 823, and Haitian 
Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, § 824. 
105. See VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1505(b) (codified as amended at INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2006». Previously any crime of domestic violence meant mandatory 
deportability. 
106. Laura Bassett and Jennifer Bendery, House GOP Lets Violence Against Women Act 
Passed By Senate Die Without a Vote, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 2, 2013, 6:38 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.coml20 13/0 1I02/violence-against-women-act-
_n_2398553.html. Cj New Classification for Victims of Severe Forms of Trafficking 
in Persons; Eligibility for T Nonimmigrant Status, 77 Fed. Reg. 61,7743 (Feb. 13, 
2012) (negotiations resulting in rule establishing application procedures and 
responsibilities for DHS). 
2013] Reflections on VA W A's Strange Bedfellows 243 
expansions of protections for battered immigrant women, but instead 
defended against the elimination of some of the basic existing 
provisions. 107 The bill was successful in adding anti-discrimination 
assurances for the LGBT community lO8 and it extended protections to 
victims in tribal regions.109 For immigrant survivors, it modestly 
improved protections by eliminating the obstacles of public charge llO 
and aging out of dependent children, III drafting warnings for fiances 
and fiancees of U.S. citizens to better inform them of their rights, 112 
and implementing regulations of international marriage brokers. l13 
Concessions were made to opponents of the bill in the form of 
accountability provisions for grant recipients 114 and a qualification of 
confidentiality for law enforcement and national security purposes. I 15 
III. MOVEMENT CHOICES TO PARTNER WITH LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
The story of how advocates for battered immigrant women were 
able to stem the tides of the burgeoning anti-immigrant currents to 
secure protections for this otherwise voiceless population is a 
remarkable one. To begin, this achievement must be applauded as a 
grassroots organizing victory for battered immigrant women who 
gained the only advances for immigrants during that period and did 
so repeatedly."6 At the same time that these developments are 
107. Tara Culp-Ressler, Violence Against Women Act Debacle: Why Congress Should be 
More Diverse, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 3, 2013, www.theatlantic.comlsexes/ 
archive/2013/01l ... act...1266784/. Also see Jennifer Bendery, Violence Against 
Women Act: Eric Cantor, Joe Biden in Talks Amid Stalled Tribal Provisions, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.coml2012112/ 
06/violence-against-women-act -eric-cantor-native-americans _ n _ 2251924.html. See 
also Robert Pear, House Vote Sets Up Battle on Domestic Violence Bill, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 17, 2012, at A19 (noting Representative Zoe Lofgren's assertion that "[t]he 
House bill rolls back protections for battered spouses and victims of serious crimes 
such as rape and sexual assault. It does so by weakening or repealing provisions that 
have had near-unanimous support of Democrats and Republicans in years past"). 
108. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 3(b)(4), 
(2013). 
109. Id. § 902. 
110. Id. § 804. 
111. Id. § 805(a). 
112. Id. § 807. 
113. Id. § 808. 
114. Id. § 1005. 
115. Id. § 810. 
116. See, e.g., LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EpSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: 
A SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 36 
(2008). 
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celebrated, a critical analysis of the aftennath of these legislative 
feats reveals unforeseen costs to the feminist movement, undennining 
some of its most fundamental principles. 117 These outcomes are 
similar to the experiences of battered women's advocates in the 
1960s and 1970s.118 
A. Battered Women's Movement 
The decision to seek out law enforcement as a primary response to 
domestic violence was not made lightly in the early feminist 
movement. Battered women's advocates believed criminal 
enforcement of domestic violence laws to be crucial to the protection 
of women, and they cautiously examined the tensions inherent in 
working with the state. 119 
Movement leaders demanded accountability from the batterer and 
from the state. 120 To varying degrees from the 1800s until the 1960s, 
the criminal and judicial systems gave men a right to beat their 
wives. 121 Even after the repeal of criminal laws specifically 
exempting violent husbands from prosecution, the police and 
prosecutors were generally unwilling to intervene in domestic 
affairs.122 The traditional pairing of sexual violence and domestic life 
created a culture of tolerance for domestic violence. 123 To counter 
this history, advocates focused on forcing the state to declare 
domestic violence a crime and to ensure that law enforcement 
agencies would act accordingly. 124 These laws successfully relocated 
domestic abuse from the private domain into the public sector. 125 In 
I 17. See id. 
I 18. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BA TIERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING I (2000). 
119. See id. at 196; GOODMAN & EpSTEIN, supra note 116, at 36; Miccio, supra note I, at 
272-73. 
120. GOODMAN & EpSTEIN, supra note 116, at 36 (stating that activists felt the state needed 
to take responsibility for a problem of such massive proportions). 
121. See Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacies o/Coverture, 28 
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 593, 597-98 (1991); Miccio, supra note I, at 252-53. 
122. Miccio, supra note I, at 266, 269. 
123. Judith Resnik, The Law: Citizenship and Violence, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 27-Apr. 10, 
2000, at 62 (explaining that when violence is understood as being about sex, it 
"softens the brutality" and provides abusers with lust as the justification). 
124. See Miccio, supra note I, at 264-65 (describing how advocates successfully 
implemented mandatory arrest as a means of holding law enforcement accountable for 
responding to domestic violence). 
125. See LEIGH GoODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM 16 (2012). 
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essence, they removed state power as a coercive force in support of 
the dominance of men, redirecting it on behalf of women. 126 
Not all advocates were in agreement with the adoption of 
enforcement as a key strategy. Many felt uneasy with employing the 
state to protect women, recognizing that police practices typically 
enforced cultural stereotypes that were gendered, raced, and 
classed. 127 Further concern centered on the misuse of police power 
against women, particularly in communities of color. 128 Advocates 
confronted the question posed by Angela Davis at the historic Color 
of Violence Conference: "Can a state that is thoroughly infused with 
racism, male dominance, class-bias, and homophobia and that 
constructs itself in and through violence, act to minimize violence in 
the lives ofwomen?,,129 
In the end, advocates conceded the partnership as a necessary 
strategy. 130 They acknowledged that any state institution would be 
plagued with varying degrees of misogynistic policies and 
procedures, and at the same time, altering women's position required 
a relationship with the state and with state actors. 131 While being 
mindful of "the roles of the state, other institutions, law, and culture 
in encouraging, legitimizing, and perpetuating violence," a middle 
ground had to be found. 132 
B. Battered Immigrant Women's Movement 
In the battered immigrant women's movement, advocates first 
rallied together for battered immigrant women in reaction to the 
passage of the 1986 Marriage Fraud Act,133 which mandated an 
126. Id. 
127. See Miccio, supra note I, at 269. 
128. Cecelia M. Espenoza, No Relief for the Weary: VAWA Relief Denied for Battered 
Immigrants Lost in the Intersections, 83 MARQ. L. REv. 163, 185-86 (1999) (noting 
that abused women of color are disadvantaged in police exercise of discretion for 
which they rely on erroneous and stereotypical attitudes and perceptions). 
129. Angela Davis, The Color of Violence Against Women, 3 COLORLINES, Fall 2000, at 4, 
6. 
130. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1887-88 (1996) (supporting the 
notion that, although it is not ideal, the benefits of aggressive prosecution of domestic 
violence perpetrators outweigh the costs). 
131. See Miccio, supra note I, at 271. 
132. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 118, at 196. 
133. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 2, 100 Stat. 
3537,3537-38 (codified as amended at INA § 216, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (2006)). The 
Marriage Fraud Act imposed a new status of "conditional resident" for an immigrant 
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additional petition for immigrant spouses to obtain full legal status. 134 
The Act passed to offset allegations of widespread immigration fraud, 
now widely accepted to have been based on purely speculative 
data. 135 The uproar that followed galvanized the advocate community 
in demanding a fix, an effort that led to the successful passage of the 
Battered Spouse Waiver in 1990. 136 Once this network had been 
formed, it used its newly established strength and congressional 
contacts to continue to push for protections for domestic violence 
victims. 137 
The strategy advocates employed to move the legislation forward 
was rational and effective: they would locate their issues inside the 
battered women's movement rather than the immigrants' rights 
movement. 138 Advocating separately for protections for immigrant 
women would not have been fruitful in the tense, anti-immigrant 
climate of the 1990s. Because national sentiment against domestic 
violence was strong, battered women's advocates rightfully assessed 
that their agenda would be better received in the context of the need 
for protection from domestic abuse, rather than the need for reform to 
having status approved based on a marriage ofless than two years. INA § 216(a)-(b). 
That status would be removed two years later when the couple submits further 
evidence of the bonafides of the marriage. ld. § 216(c)(3)(B). 
134. INA § 216(c)(I)(A). 
135. See Michelle J. Anderson, Note, Recent Development, A License to Abuse: The 
Impact of Conditional Status on Female Immigrants, 102 YALE L. J. 1401, 1419 
(1993) (noting that one of the bill's original sponsors, Representative Bruce Morrison, 
was disappointed with the Marriage Fraud Act, reiterating that Congress had "directed 
the INS to write protection regulations, not fraud regulations"). 
136. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 701(a)(4)(C), 104 Stat. 4978, 5085 
(codified as amended at INA § 216(c)(4)(C), 8 U.S.C. § I 186a(c)(4)(C) (2006)). The 
Battered Spouse Waiver was created as an exception to the requirement of the joint 
filing at the end of the conditional period, where the immigrant suffered spousal 
abuse. 
137. Representative Slaughter was approached as a sponsor due to her strong record 
against domestic violence. See Women's Issues, CONGRESSWOMAN LOUISE M. 
SLAUGHTER, http://www.louise. house.gov/index. php?option=com _ content&view= 
category&layout=blog&id=83&Itemid= 134 (last visited Jan. II, 2013). 
138. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 124~7 (1991) 
(reporting tragic consequences resulting from immigrant women being forced to 
choose "between protection from their batterers and protection against deportation ... 
put pressure on Congress to include in the Immigration Act of 1990 a provision 
amending the marriage fraud rules to allow for an explicit waiver for hardship caused 
by domestic violence"). 
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the immigration system. 139 Even the bill's sponsors had to overcome 
the fact that "illegal" immigrants would benefit. 140 The bill was 
framed as the need for protection under the law without regard to 
immigration status. 141 Congressional concerns about helping the 
undocumented were allayed by the understanding that "but for" an 
abuser's misuse of control of the immigration process through his 
refusal to exercise his power, the victim would have legal 
immigration status. 142 
In moving forward with VA WA, battered immigrant women's 
advocates had to confront the historically problematic relationship 
between law enforcement and battered women mentioned above, 
particularly for women of color. 143 These concerns were even more 
pronounced in the anti-immigrant environment since the 1990s, and 
after the changes in immigration policy (outlined above) made 
contact with law enforcement more dangerous. 144 
Following the harsh legislative changes to immigration law in 1996 
and 2001, women disproportionately shouldered the brunt of the 
militaristic enforcement measures. 145 They not only faced the risk of 
deportation for themselves or family members, but the related "risks 
139. See Leslye E. Orloff & Janice v. Kaguyutan, Offering A Helping Hand: Legal 
Protections For Battered Immigrant Women: A History Of Legislative Responses, 10 
Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 95, 143, (2002) (discussing the realization that 
immigration law provided an imperfect and often ineffective solution for many 
immigrant victims of domestic violence.) See also Sujata B. Barai, Negotiating the 
Intersection: How and Why Provisions for Battered Immigrant Women Have Become 
a Part of U.S. Immigration Policy 68 (Apr. 2, 1998) (unpublished B.A. thesis, 
Princeton University) (on file with author). 
140. Id. at 72 (quoting from an interview with legislative aide Sandra Sobrieraj, February 
17,1998). 
141. See 146 CONGo REc. 22066-67 (2000). 
142. See id. at 22070 (noting Sen. Orrin Hatch raised that the law was being used to 
blackmail the abused spouse through threats about immigration sponsorship). 
143. GOODMAN & EpSTEIN, supra note 116, at 77-78. 
144. See Deanna Kwong, Removing Barriers for Battered Immigrant Women: A 
Comparison of Immigrant Protections Under VA WA I & II, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN'S 
L.J. 137, 137, 143 (2002). 
145. Id. at 148-49; Michael T. McCarthy, Recent Development, USA Patriot Act, 39 
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 435, 435, 448-49 (2002); Andrea J. Ritchie, Law Enforcement 
Violence Against Women of Color, in COLOR OF VIOLENCE, THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY 
138, 139 (2006) (noting that women of color experience the same types of law 
enforcement violence as men of color, including "law and order agendas," "war on 
terror," "zero tolerance" policies, as well as gender-related harassment and sexual 
abuse). 
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of economic deprivation, separation from children, and [the 
possibility of] even greater violence in their home country.,,146 
The threats of immigration raids and the post-9fll societal 
perception of immigrants as potential lawbreakers or terrorists further 
intimidated women. 147 Just as the war on drugs justified the "law and 
order" policies of the last two decades, the more recent war on 
terrorism has led to military and law enforcement policing under 
"quality of life" initiatives in immigrant communities. 148 For 
immigrant women, the threat of deportation from the most minor 
police encounter became a reality as the newer laws encouraged 
linkages between the Department of Homeland Security and local 
municipalities, in essence deputizing police officers with federal 
powers. 149 Renee Saucedo, Community Empowerment Coordinator 
at La Raza Centro Legal, charged that immigration raids are used as a 
tool to subjugate women into submission. ISO Immigrant women 
experienced harassment by law enforcement directly to themselves or 
indirectly through having to tolerate abuses to others for fear of being 
caught by the police. lSI The ongoing potential threat of criminal or 
immigration law enforcement effectively silences women from 
146. See Donna Coker, Race, Poverty. and the Crime-Centered Response to Domestic 
Violence: A Comment on Linda Mills's Insult to Injury: Rethinking Our Responses to 
Intimate Abuse, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1331, 1334 (2004) (exposing several 
of the laws' vulnerabilities for immigrant women: "Conviction for domestic violence 
is a deportable offense (8 U.S.C. § 1227), and although the attorney general may 
waive deportation for those acting in self-defense, some battered women's violence is 
unlikely to fit the definition of self-defense .... "); see also Espenoza, supra note 128, 
at 185-86; Linda Kelly, Stories From the Front: Seeking Refuge for Battered 
Immigrants in the Violence Against Women Act, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 665 passim 
(1998); Leslye E. Orloff, et ai., With No Place to Turn: Improving Legal Advocacy for 
Battered Immigrant Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 313 passim (1995); Julia L. Perilla, 
Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue: The Case of Immigrant Latinos, 21 HlsP. 
J. BEHAV. SCI. 107,118,122 (1999). 
147. See Ritchie, supra note 145, at 139, 154-55. 
148. /d. at 155. 
149. See INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006). 
150. Renee Saucedo, INS Raids and How Immigrant Women are Fighting Back, in COLOR 
OF VIOLENCE, THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY, supra note 145, at 135-37; cf Julia Sudbury, 
Rethinking Antiviolence Strategies: Lessons from the Black Women's Movement in 
Britain, in COLOR OF VIOLENCE, THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY, supra note 145, at 13, 19 
(noting that the anti-violence movements in the United States, Britain, and Canada 
have all been complicit in the law enforcement agenda simultaneous to the 
globalization of the last two decades); Renee Saucedo Community Empowerment 
Coordinator, LA RAzA CENTRO LEGAL, http://lrci.electricembers.netJ 
article.php/article.php?story=rsaucedo_bio (last visited Jan. 11,2013). 
151. Saucedo, supra note 150, at 135-37. 
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complaining about sexual harassment or asserting basic rights, thus 
making immigrant women easy prey for unscrupulous employers, 
landlords, or others with power. 152 
In spite of the dangers, many advocates for battered immigrant 
women agreed that working through the law enforcement framework 
was the only realistic way to access immigration relief. 153 
IV. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT SUCCESSES 
As the subsequent phases of the battered women's movement 
gained the targeted benefits from partnering with law enforcement 
agencies, each also experienced a significant erosion of basic feminist 
principles. 154 This section will chronicle some of the losses for the 
battered women's movement generally and then focus on those of the 
battered immigrant women's movement more specifically. 
A. Battered Women's Movement 
1. Questioning Survivor Autonomy 
The demands of early battered women's advocates that domestic 
abuse be treated as a serious crime successfully led to policies of 
mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution, among others. 155 While 
these policies accomplished the goal of ensuring that law 
enforcement would take decisive action toward protecting battered 
women, they also challenged the notion of survivor agency or 
independence. 156 Instead of fostering a return of choice to a survivor, 
the state usurped control of the decision-making process. Once the 
police were called, mandatory policies removed from the victim all 
control of the process or the outcome. 157 The prosecution moved 
forward regardless of the threat of retaliation against the victim, the 
economic support provided to the family by the abuser, or her wish to 
152. Id. 
153. See Emi Koyama, Disloyal to Feminism: Abuse of Survivors within the Domestic 
Violence Shelter System, in COLOR OF VIOLENCE, THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY, supra note 
145, at 208,220. 
154. GOODMAN & EpSTEIN, supra note 116, at 36 (asserting that expanded available 
resources "also diminished the movement's original feminist orientation"). 
155. GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 106-07. 
156. Id.; see also Miccio, supra note 1, at 240-42. 
157. GoODMARK, supra note 125, at 107. 
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forgive or reconcile with her partner. 158 Her agency ended when she 
first accessed the protection of the state. 
Some early proponents of mandatory state action justified this shift 
in agency with the thesis that a victim of domestic abuse had an 
impaired ability to make autonomous decisions in her own self-
interest. 159 Such hypotheses failed to recognize the multitude of ways 
survivors of domestic violence exercise decision-making within the 
abusive relationship.160 Regardless of these critiques, policies were 
accepted as necessary to protect women. 
In retrospect, advocates predominantly conclude that the battered 
women's movement unnecessarily ceded control over the responses 
to domestic violence, enabling the state to take primary responsibility 
for addressing, defining and analyzing domestic violence and for 
determining the objectives of the response. 161 Many critics view this 
phenomenon as the state successfully quashing the women's 
movement's anti-violence campaign.162 Advocates of the 1960s and 
1970s envisioned criminalization only as an initial undertaking in a 
broader coordinated strategy to gain safety, autonomy, and 
accountability for victims of domestic violence. 163 It was never 
intended to be the sole strategy of the movement, but a first step. 164 
2. Government Control of the Nature of Services 
Once law enforcement was elevated as the central strategy against 
domestic violence, the government backed its commitment with 
158. Ana Clarissa Rojas Durazo, "we were never meant to survive" in THE REVOLUTION 
WILL NOT BE FUNDED, BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, 119 (2007). 
GOODMAN & EpSTEIN, supra note 116, at 75. 
159. GOODMARK, supra note 1265, at 121-22; see also MARILYN FRIEDMAN, AUTONOMY, 
GENDER, POLITICS 151 (2003) (suggesting that the state should act to protect women 
even ifit is against their wishes). 
160. GOODMARK, supra note 1265, at 122-23; see also Miccio, supra note I, at 320-21 
(equating the ability of battered women to that of Holocaust survivors to exercise 
resistance in an oppressive environment). 
161. See Rojas Durazo supra note 158, at 117-118 (asserting that in limiting the definition 
of domestic violence to individual crimes, government excluded state violence and 
effectively broke up the movement's radical, social justice agenda). GOODMARK, 
supra note 1265, at 6. '-. 
162. /d. at 117 ("Through funding and non-profitization, the movement was called in to 
sleep with the enemy, the US state, the central organizer of violence against women in 
the world."). 
163. Miccio, supra note 1, at 265-67; SCHECHTER, supra note 10, at 159-61. 
164. Miccio, supra note 1, at 265. 
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strong funding directives. 165 V A W A made available approximately 
$550 million per fiscal year.166 By relying upon the criminal justice 
system as the principal response to domestic violence, state domestic 
response resources were funneled almost exclusively into law 
enforcement projects. 167 As a result, few other approaches to impact 
the economic, social, or political realities of battered women were 
developed. 168 
Non-profit funding had the same effect of funding programs that 
did not fundamentally challenge the status quo. Some assert that the 
non-profit industrial complex is a tool for capitalist interests to 
monitor and control social justice movements, manage dissent, and 
redirect mass organizing efforts away from transformation. 169 
Regardless of the intentions of private donors, the funding stream 
reinforced that social change efforts would be financed and therefore 
controlled by benefactors rather than by community constituents. 170 
The results of the influx of funding had a surprisingly significant 
impact on the movement. Programs that served victims of domestic 
violence were expanded by over fifty percent in less than a decade. 171 
Domestic violence advocates did not foresee that over time this 
receipt of desperately needed resources into their programs would co-
opt the feminist underpinnings of the movement. 172 Along with the 
flow of government funds came demands for professionalism and 
accountability to the state. State and private funding streams favored 
"shelters founded by established charities over those begun by 
165. GARRINE P. LANEY, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., RL30871, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
ACT: HISTORY AND FEDERAL FUNDING 1-2 (2010), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edulcgilviewcontent.cgi ?article= 1 716&context=key _ 
workplace. 
166. See id. at 3-9. 
167. See Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence 
Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 801,804-05 (2001). 
168. Id.; see also GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 6. 
169. Andrea Smith, Introduction, The Revolution Will Not Be Funded, THE REVOLUTION 
WILL NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, 3 (2007) 
170. Id. at 9. 
171. See GOODMAN & EpSTEIN, supra note 116, at 38 (funding increased rapidly from 1986 
to 1994); GoODMARK, supra note 125, at 25-26. 
172. See GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 27; see also SCHECHTER, supra note 10, at 6 
(forewarned as early as 1982 that "shelters need to view themselves simultaneously as 
services and as movement organizations. Only by maintaining this tension will the 
spirit of progressive social change continue to inspire women and help mobilize them 
for the fight ahead to keep shelter doors open"). 
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feminists.,,173 "Because these organizations were not feminist ... 
both programmatic and organizational focus changed.,,174 
When state funds were directed to feminist-run agencies, strict 
conditions were imposed that began to change the very nature of the 
shelters that were previously at the center of the battered women's 
movement. 175 Before partnering with law enforcement, shelters were 
often managed in a non-hierarchical fashion and staffed by survivors 
of domestic violence.176 Women needing shelter were welcomed as 
sisters. 177 Shelters were a site for "consciousness-raising" and 
profound examination of the position of women in a patriarchal 
society. 178 
In contrast, state funding altered the way in which shelters 
operated. The government demanded academically credentialed staff 
and traditional governance, marginalizing survivors without 
professional academic degrees and destroying the egalitarian 
operational structures. 179 Battered women became "clients" and 
shelters were forced to track information reflecting clinical 
perspectives. 180 Private foundations similarly preferred funding 
organizations focused on policy and legal reform, or campaigns with 
measurable results and specific programmatic goals. Such directives 
further encouraged a professionalization of the movement, straying 
further from grassroots driven organizing. 181 Eventually the battered 
women's movement was depoliticized and de-contextualized from its 
feminist roots. No longer was the eradication of domestic violence 
understood to depend on ending women's subordination and 
173. GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 25 (citing ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: 
THE MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST F AMIL Y VIOLENCE FROM 
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 194 (1987» (discussing the historical analysis of 
social policy shaping funding for family violence). 
174. Miccio, supra note 1, at 291. 
175. Id. at 257, 292-93. 
176. See GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 25; see also Miccio, supra note I, at 292-93. 
177. SCHECHTER, supra note 10, at 4; see also Judith L. Herman, Foreword to GOODMAN & 
EpSTEIN, supra note 116, at xii (commenting about the early days of the women's 
movement). 
178. See Miccio, supra note 1, at 313-14 ("[Consciousness-raising] groups were utilized in 
the early battered women's movement as a vehicle to deconstruct sUbjective 
knowledge about male intimate violence and to approximate common ground."). 
179. Patricia Gaddis, In the Beginning: A Creation Story of Battered Women's Shelters, 
OFF OUR BACKS: THE FEMINIST NEWSJOURNAL, Oct. 2001, at 14, 15; see also Miccio, 
supra note I, at 292-93. Also see Rojas Durazo, supra note 158, at 116-17. 
180. See GOODMAN & EpSTEIN, supra note 116, at 43-44. 
181. See Smith, supra note 169, at 7. 
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increasing their economic and social empowerment. 182 The vision of 
broad social change had been replaced by service de1iverables. 183 
B. Battered Immigrant Women's Movement 
Consonant to the experience of the broader battered women's 
movement discussed above, the advances gained by the battered 
immigrant women brought forth serious challenges to germane 
feminist principles. V A W A legislation merged the interests of the 
state with those of the movement to end domestic violence but in a 
way that pulled the movement in new directions. 184 The 
criminalization of domestic violence created a dual advantage for the 
state: the perpetrator became the sole party responsible for violence 
against women and the state allied itself with battered women against 
the perpetrator. 185 Activists ultimately relinquished to law 
enforcement the power to frame and legislate the issues. 186 In time, 
the language and requirements of the expanded laws served to 
undermine survivors by rewarding victimhood and by demanding 
dependence. 187 
1. Framing of the Issues 
Since the passage of VA W A 1994, the initial, unified stand against 
domestic violence by feminists and bipartisan congressional sponsors 
has slipped from legislative consciousness and has been sacrificed to 
other objectives. 188 The purpose statements of the original V A W A 
and the subsequent reauthorizations provide insight into the changes 
in the framing of the issues. Each of the bills reference law 
enforcement aims, however, the preliminary statements of the bills' 
subsections introducing protection for battered immigrant women 
182. Jd. at 117 (as organizations became dependent on private foundations, they lose 
political autonomy and their sense of accountability shifts from their constituents to 
their funders). See also GOODMAN & EpSTEIN, supra note 116, at 47; see also 
Koyama, supra note 153, at 213-14. 
183. See Durazo, supra note 158, at 118, 123-24 ("The social servicization of the anti-
violence movement undermined social change."). 
184. ld. at 119. 
185. ld. at 118. 
186. See GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 128. 
187. See Espenoza, supra note 128, at 220. 
188. Janet Calvo, A Decade of Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: Coverture's 
Diminishment, but Not Its Demise, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 153, ISS (2004). 
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expose the shift in thinking of the congressional sponsors and the 
relative power of the advocates from the women's movement. 189 
The preamble of VAWA 1994, enacted as Title N of the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Authorization, 
provides a clear message that a loophole in the law facilitating 
domestic abuse was unacceptable and must be corrected. 190 It 
recognizes that "some abusive citizens or lawful permanent 
residents. .. misuse their control over the petitioning process. 
Instead of helping close family members to legally immigrate, they 
use this discretionary power to perpetuate domestic violence against 
their spouses and minor children who have been living with them in 
the United States.,,191 
By the VTVP A Reauthorization Act 2000, a dual purpose was 
adopted, replacing the singular message of the original VA W A. 192 It 
set forth the purposes of the amendments: "(1) to remove barriers to 
criminal prosecutions of persons who commit acts of battery or 
extreme cruelty against immigrant women and children; and (2) to 
offer protection against domestic violence occurring in family and 
intimate relationships that are covered in State and tribal protection 
orders, domestic violence, and family law statutes.,,193 
Section 1513 of the VTVP A 2000 conceived the U visa with the 
purpose "to create a new nonimmigrant visa classification that will 
strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to detect, 
investigate, and prosecute cases of domestic violence, sexual assault, 
trafficking of aliens, and other crimes described in section 
101 (a)(15)(U)(iii) of the INA committed against aliens, while 
offering protection to victims of such offenses in keeping with the 
humanitarian interests of the United States.,,194 Here the language is 
explicit that law enforcement is the priority, with protection of the 
victim considered a supportive, secondary goal. 195 
189. See VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701, 108 Stat. at 1953-54; VTVPA, supra note 9, 
§ 1502(b), 114 Stat. at"1518. 
190. See VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701, 108 Stat. at 1953-54; 61 Fed. Reg. 
59,13061,59,13062 (Mar. 26, 1996). 
191. 61 Fed. Reg. 59,13061, 59,13062 (Mar. 26, 1996) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.2 
(1997)). 
192. VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1502,114 Stat. at 1518; see VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 
40701, 108 Stat. at 1953. 
193. VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1502, 114 Stat. at 1518. 
194. ld. § 1513(a)(2)(A), 114 Stat. at 1533. 
195. ld. 
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The subsequent reauthorizations in section Title VIII-Protection 
of Battered and Trafficked Immigrants from 2005 196 and that of 
2013-have no statement of findings or purpose. Those bills 
launched directly into the legislative changes, which were far more 
moderate than those from the original V A W A. Perhaps by the later 
reauthorizations, the history of V A W A was redundant. This silence, 
however, is conspicuous in light of the vigorous opposition preceding 
the bills and the harsher tones of the law that followed. 
Whereas the three prior bills all received strong bipartisan support, 
negotiations on V A W A 2013 failed last year precisely along party 
lines. Much of the controversy surrounded the expanded protections 
to victims from the LGBT community,. tribal populations and 
undocumented immigrants. The statements by elected officials during 
the hostile debates about the 2013 reauthorization illustrate the 
disparate frameworks. Senator Grassley, a prime opponent of the 
Senate bill, explained his objection by stating "The substitute creates 
so many new programs for underserved populations that it risks 
losing focus on helping victims, period." Further, regarding 
immigrant survivors, Grassley posed the legislative aims as follows: 
"V A W A is meant to protect victims of violence. It shouldn't be an 
avenue to expand immigration law or give additional benefits to 
people here unlawfully.,,197 
In contrast, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Pat Leahy urged 
the House to consider the broader version of VA W A, emphasizing 
that Congress couldn't "pick and choose" which victims to protect 
under the legislation. 198 He maintained that the purpose of V A W A 
was to protect all victims of sexual assault or domestic violence, 
declaring "a victim is a victim is a victim and violence is violence is 
violence. ,,199 
2. Narrowing Relief to Innocent, Deserving Victims 
196. See V A WA 2005, supra note 9, § 801, 119 Stat. at 3053. 
197. Amanda Turkel, Violence Against Women Act Becomes Partisan Issue, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Feb. 16,2012,5:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02114/violence-
against-women-act_n_1273097.html. 
198. Mercedes White, Why Some Oppose Extension To Violence Against Women Act, 
DESERET NEWS (Feb. 14, 2013, 12:12 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/ 
865573170IWhy-some-oppose-extension-to-Violence-Against-Women-Act.html. 
199. Sunlen Miller, Senate Passes Violence Against Women Act, ABC NEWS (Feb. 12, 
2013, 5 :26 PM), http://abcnews.go.comlblogs/politics/20 13/02/senate-passes-
violence-against-womens-actl. 
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The original VA WA legislation was written in a straight-forward 
manner, reflecting a focused goal to provide battered women with 
exceptions in the law enabling them to legalize their status 
independent from the control of their abusers.200 If an applicant met 
the criteria for self-petitioning, she was eligible for the relief. 201 As 
long as the applicant could show she had been a victim of physical 
battering or extreme cruelty, the law would excuse immigration 
violations from her past that would have otherwise prevented her 
from legalizing her status.202 The justification was simple; no woman 
should be trapped in an abusive relationship. 203 That clarity of 
message was lost in the later developments of the law. 
1. All Qualifying Victims 
In the initial legislation, an immigrant married to a U.S. citizen or 
legal permanent resident could "self-petition" for her own residency 
if she could meet the following elements: show a legal and good faith 
marriage, joint residence, spousal abuse, good moral character and 
extreme hardship.204 There was no examination of why the 
immigrant did not already have status, whether she arrived without 
documentation, overstayed a temporary visa, or violated other 
immigration provisions.20s It was enough that Congress recognized 
the terrible predicament created when the abuser had control of his 
victim's immigration status. The focus of the law was prospective 
towards a remedy, independent of past-based fault or merit. 
To facilitate appropriate adjudication of the self-petition, 
exceptions to corresponding sections of immigration law were 
devised.206 To begin, the evidentiary standard for proving abuse was 
established as "any credible evidence. ,,207 This standard reflected an 
acknowledgement that domestic abuse commonly happened behind 
closed doors and that not every survivor sought help from police or 
medical providers.208 A 1996 INS memorandum clarified that a 
200. VA WA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701, 108 Stat. at 1953. 
201. !d. 
202. See id. 
203. VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1502(a)(I), 114 Stat. at 1518 (codified as amended 8 U.S.c. 
§ 1101 (2006)). 
204. VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701(a)(I)(C), 108 Stat. at 1954 (codified as amended 
at INA § 204(a)(l), 8 U.S.c. § I I 54(a)(I)). 
205. See id. 
206. See id. § 40701(a)(2)-{3). 
207. ld. § 4070 I (a)(3). 
208. Cj Habrzyk v. Habrzyk, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (discussing the 
difficulty in meeting the clear and convincing standard for battered parents using the 
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woman's affidavit by itself, if sufficiently detailed and credible, 
could successfully support a self-petition application.209 A flexible 
standard was consistent with the overarching goal of facilitating 
survivors in leaving abusive homes. 
VTVP A 2000 and VA W A 2013 provide examples of practical 
amendments to V A W A that made the self-petitioning requirements 
more accessible to all qualified applicants; first, by removing one of 
the initial requirements, second, by granting the ability to adjust 
status to legal permanent resident status in the United States, and 
third by eliminating the barrier of public charge.21o 
Example I: Extreme Hardship 
The 1994 V A W A self-petition required proof that the applicant or 
her children would suffer "extreme hardship" if she were deported 
back to her home country.211 There was no specific definition 
provided for extreme hardship; however, it had to encompass "more 
than the mere economic deprivation. . . [ or] readjustment to life in 
the native country after having spent a number of years in the United 
States .... ,,212 The types of acceptable evidence could include "the 
nature and extent of the physical and psychological consequences of 
the battering or extreme cruelty[,] ... the impact of the loss of access 
to the U.S. courts and criminal justice system ... [, or the] abuser's 
ability to travel to the foreign country" to cause further harm. 213 In 
the VTVP A reauthorization in 2000, the extreme hardship element 
was entirely removed from the requirements,214 recognizing that it 
presented a devastating obstacle for survivors and unnecessarily 
focused on the immigrant's life in the home country, a prerequisite 
grave risk of hann defense); Petitions for Relatives, Widows and Widowers, and 
Abused Spouses and Children, 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(iv) (2007) (discussing the 
various avenues in which battered women seek treatment or support). 
209. Petition to Classify Alien as Immediate Relative of a United States Citizen or as a 
Preference Immigrant; Self-Petitioning for Certain Battered or Abused Spouses and 
Children, 61 Fed. Reg. 59,13061, 59,13066 (Mar. 26, 1996) (codified at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.2 (1997» ("The Service is not precluded from deciding ... that the self-
petitioner's unsupported affidavit is credible and that it provides relevant evidence of 
sufficient weight to meet the self-petitioner's burden of proof."). 
210. VTVPA, supra note 9, §§ 1501, 1504(a), \14 Stat. at 1505,1522-23,1525-27. 
211. VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701(a)(1)(C), 108 Stat. at 1953-54. 
212. Petition to Classify Alien as Immediate Relative of a United States Citizen or as a 
Preference Immigrant; Self-Petitioning for Certain Battered or Abused Spouses and 
Children, 61 Fed. Reg. at 59,13067. 
213. ld. 
214. See VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1503(b)(I), 114 Stat. at 1518-19 (codified as amended in 
INA § 204(a)(1), 8 U.S.c. § I I 54(a)(I) (2006». 
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that did not parallel the family petitioning process.215 With this 
change, the process was made more consistent with the congressional 
intent for all applicants. 
Example 2: Adjustment of Status 
Next, the VTVPA 2000 addressed impediments created by changes 
in IIRAIRA that made battered spouses with approved self-petitions, 
no longer able to complete the legalization process of obtaining legal 
permanent residents if they were out of status.216 According to the 
provisions of IIRAIRA, an immigrant who had entered the country 
without a visa or who had overstayed her visa was prevented from 
adjusting her status unless she was married to a U.S. citizen.217 In 
response, Congress included in VTVP A 2000 a direct amendment to 
INA § 245(a), the statute governing eligibility to adjust status in the 
United States, to include all VA W A self-petitioners regardless of the 
manner of entry into the country or the length of time since the 
expiration of any prior legal status.218 There was no need for an 
applicant to explain the reason she had fallen out of status, nor any 
requirement to tie that infraction to the abusive spouse. It was 
enough that the applicant had already satisfactorily proved the 
elements of the self-petition.219 
Example 3: Public Charge 
In spite of the intense debates on some of the provisions in VA W A 
2013, the removal of the public charge ground of inadmissibility 
received little attention. Ordinarily, a person seeking adjustment of 
status to a legal permanent resident via the family based process must 
make available her financial history and that of the sponsor. These 
records are scrutinized to determine the likelihood that the applicant 
215. See supra note 139, at 145. 
216. See VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1506(a), 114 Stat. at 1527 (codified as amended in INA 
§ 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255)). 
217. IIRAIRA § 301 (b)(l), 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified at INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.c. 
§ 1182(a)(9)(B) (2006)). The combination of being prevented from using adjustment 
of status within the limitations of INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) and the three and 
ten year bars that were passed under IIRAIRA means that many immigrants married 
to US citizens or legal permanent residents are unable to legalize their status, even 
after years of residing in the US. See INA, Pub. L. No. 84-414, § 245(a), 66 Stat. 163, 
217,8 U.S.c. § 1255(a) (2006); I1RAIRA § 301(b)(I), 110 Stat. at 3009-575-3009-
576,8 U.S.C. § I I 82(a)(9)(B)(i). 
218. VTVPA, supra note 9, §§ 1502--03, 114 Stat. at 1518-19 (codified as amended in 
INA § 204(a), 8 U.S.C. § I I 54(a)). 
219. See id. § 1503. 
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would become a public charge, or financially depend on the state. If 
minimum financial stability is not shown, the applicant can be denied 
her legal permanent residency. Under VTVP A 2000, self-petitioners 
were exempt from having to provide the typical affidavit of support 
demonstrating the financial health of the sponsor, since there was no 
sponsor. However the applicant still needed to establish her ability to 
support herself. V A W A 2013 made all applicants for adjustment of 
status based on the battered spouse protections, exempt from the 
examination of public charge. As in the above sections, the fact that 
the applicant was a victim of domestic violence was adequate 
justification. There was no need to provide a nexus between the 
domestic abuse and her immediate financial state, nor that she was 
without fault for causing her weak economic health. The waiver was 
for all self-petitioners. 
Consistent with the purpose of the VA W A, the congressional intent 
was clear that all battered women should have access to self-
petitioning and should be permitted to take advantage of a path to 
legal permanent status.220 Both the removal of the extreme hardship 
language and the exceptions to the adjustment of status process were 
fashioned for all applicants without imposing any individual 
scrutiny.221 
ii. The Innocent Victim 
Changes in the nascent objective of V A W A began to occur in the 
2000 Act as advocates pushed for expanded assistance to battered 
immigrant women. 222 In contrast to the blanket exceptions for self-
petitioners outlined above, a very different paradigm was crafted for 
those with other immigration infractions. 
Now, in order to become a legal permanent resident, an approved 
self-petitioner with an immigration violation needed to show she was 
not responsible for having caused the infraction, but that her abuser 
had forced it upon her. 223 It could be argued that the good immigrants 
were innocent of wrongdoing and were assumed worthy, while those 
220. Mayte Santacruz Benavidez, Comment, Learning from the Recent Interpretation of 
INA Section 245(a): Factors to Consider When Interpreting Immigration Law, 96 
CAL. L. REv. 1603, 1609-10 (2008). 
221. See id. 
222. See Orloff & Kaguyutan, supra note l39, at 145-56. 
223. See Violence Against Women Act of 2000 § 1505(b)(1), 8 U.S.c. § 1227(a)(7)(A) 
(2006). 
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who were themselves responsible for their immigration infractions 
(bad immigrants) had to prove they deserved relief:224 The later 
amendments providing exceptions to the bars for unlawful presence, 
the failure to depart under voluntary departure, and the bigamy 
exception illustrate the added level of individual scrutiny. 
Example 1: Unlawful Presence 
As noted earlier, the concept of "unlawful presence," classified the 
time an immigrant is present in the United States without 
authorization.225 The unlawful presence becomes problematic only 
when an immigrant leaves the country after collecting six months or 
one year in this category, causing her to be ineligible for receiving 
legal permanent residence for three or ten years, respectively.226 The 
2005 reauthorization aimed to overcome this barrier for approved 
self-petitioners by creating a waiver for some applicants. 227 
Eligibility for the waiver was made contingent on proof of a 
"substantial connection" between the reason for her leaving the 
country and the abuse she endured. 228 If no such connection existed 
or could be proved, an approved self-petitioner would be unable to 
access this waiver and would be prevented from becoming a 
permanent resident of the U.S.229 
Example 2: Failure to depart after voluntary departure 
A similarly narrow exception was passed for violators of another 
immigration provision, voluntary departure. 23o After an immigrant in 
224. Cj id. 
225. IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 30l(b)(1), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-576 (1996) 
(codified as amended in INA § 2l2(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 82(a)(9)(8)(ii) (2006)). 
226. /d., 8 U.S.C. § l182(a)(9)(8)(i)(II). After collecting more than 180 days but less than 
365 days of unlawful presence, the immigrant will be inadmissible for three years. 
Id., 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 82(a)(9)(8)(i)(I). If more than 365 days of unlawful presence is 
acquired, the bar will be ten years. Id.,8 U.S.c. § 1 I 82(a)(9)(8)(i)(II). 
227. Jd. § 30l(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(ii). 
228. Jd.,8 U.S.C. § 1 1 82(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I1I). 
229. See id. § 30l(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(8)(i). Practically speaking, many VAWA 
petitioners would not be subjected to these bars since the amendments to § 245(a) 
mentioned above mean that self-petitioners could adjust their status in the U.S. 
without having to leave the country and trigger the bars. See supra notes 218-219 and 
accompanying text. Some self-petitioners, however, make themselves inadmissible 
under this ground prior to the self-petition, or leave the U.S. for other reasons, such as 
family emergencies. 
230. IIRAIRA, § 304(a), 8 U.S.c. § l229c(b)(1) (2006). 
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removal proceedings loses her case in immigration court, the 
immigration judge can grant voluntary departure in lieu of a removal 
order.231 If the immigrant agrees to leave the country voluntarily at 
her own expense and within a specific time allotment, the 
immigration judge can allow her to use this path to avoid the negative 
consequences of a removal order.232 Failure to actually depart in 
accordance with a grant of voluntary departure will bar the immigrant 
from becoming a legal permanent resident for a ten-year period and 
could subject her to civil penalties as well.233 Congress, again 
exempted some approved self-petitioners from this bar, but only 
those who could demonstrate that the "extreme cruelty or battery was 
at least one central reason for ... overstaying the grant of voluntary 
departure.,,234 For those who could not meet this standard, the waiver 
would be denied.235 
Example 3: Bigamy Exception 
After the initial VA W A, advocates saw that in addition to other guile, 
abusers frequently deceived their spouses about the validity of the 
marriage itself. Many women attempted to self-petition as abused 
spouses of U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents, only to find that 
the marriage was invalid. VTVP A 2000 was responsive to this 
discovery by designing an exception for these circumstances, but 
only if the applicant could show that she had been misled and was not 
complicit in the bigamy.236 VAWA 2013 extends this exception to 
conditional residents using the battered spouse waiver to receive her 
permanent residence.237 Identical qualifying language from VTVP A 
limited the waiver to those innocent of wrongdoing. 238 
231. Jd. 
232. Jd.,8 U.S.c. § 1229c(b)(I)(A)-(B). 
233. VAWA 2005, supra note 9, § 81 (codified as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(I)(A)-(B) 
(amending INA § 240B)). 
234. VAWA 2005, supra note 9, § 81 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.c. § 1229c(d)(2)). 
235. Jd. 
236. INA §§ 204(a)(l)(A)(ii)(II)(aa)(BB) and 204(a)(I)(B)(ii)(II)(aa)(BB). 
237. See supra note 135. 
238. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act 0[2013 (Enrolled Bill [Final as Passed 
Both House and Senate] sec. 2 Title VIIl, sec. 806. 
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In each of these examples the applicants had already proved the 
abuse and had their petitions granted. This fact alone was no longer 
sufficient to open a pathway to the freedom of legal permanent 
residency. Unless the approved self-petitioner could also show her 
innocence in the immigration infraction by tying it to the abuse, her 
former violation would not be forgiven. 239 If a survivor had met her 
abuser after she had already violated the terms of unlawful presence 
or voluntary departure, or she was aware of her abuser's bigamy, she 
would not qualify for the exemption from those bars, even if her 
abuser specifically used her lack of status as part of his abuse.24o 
111. The Deserving Victim 
The last grouping of exceptions was constructed for battered 
immigrant women who are not innocent of past infractions and are 
therefore required to show themselves deserving of exception. 
Special V A W A motions to reopen and requirements for the U visa 
will serve as examples. 
Example 1: V A W A Motions to Reopen 
Some approved self-petitioners had previously been apprehended 
and ordered deported or removed by immigration authorities, often in 
absentia and even without their knowledge. 241 Before an immigrant 
with a prior removal order can seek permanent immigration status, 
she must first re-open the old removal order in immigration court.242 
For immigrants generally, the regulations allow only ninety days after 
the issuance of the order to reopen.243 
In this regard, VTVP A 2000 promulgated an exception for 
approved self-petitioners who needed to reopen cases beyond one 
year after a final order of deportation or remova1.244 To utilize this 
239. See VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1504(a), 114 Stat. at 1522-23 (2000) (codified as 
amended at INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A». 
240. Cf id. 
24l. See IIRAIRA § 304(a), 8 U.S.c. § 1229a(b)(5)(A)-(C). The common scenario is an 
immigrant who is bonded out of detention and leaves officials with an address for 
future communication but does not remain at that address and thus never receives 
notice ofa hearing. See id., 8 U.S.c. § 1229(a)(l). Actual service is irrelevant, as the 
onus is on the immigrant to provide the government with address updates. Jd., 8 
U.S.C. § 1229(a)(I)(F)(i)-(ii). 
242. See id., 8 U.S.c. § 1229a(b)(5)(C). 
243. Id.,8 U.S.C. § I 229a(c)(7)(C)(i). 
244. VTVPA, supra note 9, § IS06(c)(I)(A) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 
I 229a(c)(7)(iv». 
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exception, a woman must not only show her eligibility for the 
underlying battered spouse protection, but must additionally prove 
"extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship to ... [her] child" 
(not to herself). 245 Although the applicant's self-petition may already 
have been evaluated and approved, if she cannot meet these 
additional requirements to reopen her court case, she will never be 
able to obtain the security intended by the V A W A provisions.246 
Embedded in this requirement is the assumption that the deserving 
victim would have acted timely, before the lapse of one year. 
Legislators can then justify a heightened standard beyond the one 
year mark for survivors, many of whom will not be able to overcome 
this impediment and will be unable to achieve permanent 
immigration status. 247 
Example 2: The U Visa 
The U visa is procedurally positioned differently, as it is outside the 
previously discussed amendments for survivors of domestic violence 
who would have had relief based on their marriage to a United States 
citizen or legal permanent resident. 248 The U visa marked expanded 
relief to reach a battered woman who was not married to her abusive 
partner or whose abusive spouse did not have legal status. 249 The U 
visa remains a useful example of the concept of a "deserving victim" 
because it requires for relief further proof of merit, beyond the 
baseline proof of being a crime victim.250 In order to qualify for U 
visa relief the applicant must also show that she had suffered 
"substantial" harm and that she has offered assistance to law 
enforcement. 25 I On top of proving the domestic abuse, an applicant 
must demonstrate her worthiness of relief by the degree to which she 
was harmed and by her usefulness to law enforcement in prosecuting 
the case.252 
24S. Id.; see also Orloff & Kaguyutan, supra note 21S, at IS8. 
246. See VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701(a)(l)(C) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 
IIS4(a)(l)(A)). 
247. See VTVPA, supra note 9, § l506(c)(l)(A) (codified as amended 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(c)(7)(iv)) (leaving sole discretion to the Attorney General for decisions on 
whether or not to waive the one-year time limitation for filing motions to reopen). 
248. Compare id. §§ 1502-06, with id. § IS13. 
249. See id. § 1513(a)(2), 114 Stat. at 1533-34. 
250. Id. § IS 13(b)(3) (codified as amended 8 U.S.c. § llOl(a)(IS)(U)(i)-(ii)) (providing a 
broad list of twenty-six qualifying crimes, including domestic abuse). 
2S1. Id. § IS03(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 11 01(a)(l5)(U)(i)(I)-(III). 
2S2. See id. 
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While the immigration violations of applicants in this grouping are 
no more serious that those discussed in the fIrst section, the tenor of 
Congress had changed as the reauthorization bills were passed. The 
exceptions ceased to be forward-looking toward the survivor 
accessing safety and independence, but were now past-based, 
scrutinizing mnocence and requiring an earned deservedness for 
relief. 253 
Many of the 2012 proposed amendments put forth in the substitute 
bill from the House of Representatives contained the demand for 
earning the relief sought. HR4970 proposed fraud investigations 
against self-petitioners requiring an in-person interview, raising the 
standard of proof to clear and convincing evidence, and making relief 
contingent upon the abuser's conviction of any domestic violence 
crimes.254 That amendment further restricted U visas availability to 
only those who report crimes within 60 days and while still within the 
statute of limitations for the crime, when the investigation or 
prosecution was active, and where the identify of the perpetrator 
could be known.255 The bill's sponsor Representative Chuck 
Grassley explained that with these changes, U visas will become a 
"true law enforcement tool" and that these provisions would ensure 
that help is "real" and "signifIcantly advances an actual investigation 
or prosecution.,,256 All of these amendments were defeated in 
Congress. 
3. Creating Dependence 
The third way in which the immigration proVIsIOns for battered 
women diverged from the essential principles of the feminist 
movement was in moving away from a model intent on returning 
agency to the survivor, toward more recent provisions that created 
further dependence for a domestic violence victim on law 
enforcement offIcials. 
253. Cf Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards' Fathers and Good Victims: 
Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51 
HASTINGS L.J. 557, 580 (2000) (raising concerns about characterizing women as only 
deserving protection if they are good victims). 
254. H.R. 4970 §801, Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of2012. 
255. H.R. 4970 §802(2)(8) Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of2012. 
256. Senator Chuck Grassley, Judiciary Committee Executive Business Meeting 
Violence Against Women Act, Nominations (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/ Article.cfm?customel_ dataPageID _1502=3882. 
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The public perception of a woman who experienced domestic 
abuse transitioned over the years from early accusations of 
masochistic tendencies,257 theories of learned helplessness and the 
"battered women's syndrome,,,258 and fmally to the more modem 
construct of a "survivor.,,259 Portraying women who had experienced 
domestic violence as survivors acknowledged that battered women 
are found in a society providing them with limited options and that, 
within this context, they actively take measures to protect themselves 
and their children from abuse.260 Shelters that were a part of the 
feminist movement empowered women through programs that 
expanded their options and by validating their individual choices as 
legitimate.261 The language of early VAWA protections for 
immigrant women recognized the importance of ensuring that 
survivors had control of these processes; however, the later 
provisions involving law enforcement do not. 262 
a. Early Control of Process By Immigrant Survivor 
The 1994 VA W A provisions corrected the imbalance that the U. S. 
citizen or legal permanent resident spouse had complete control over 
the petitioning process, a fact that was thoroughly exploited by 
abusers. V A W A allowed a battered immigrant spouse to take charge 
of the legalization process for herself and her children. 263 Under 
V A W A, it was the applicant who would self-select as a battered 
spouse and choose to begin her own immigration petition.264 With 
the "any credible evidence" standard referenced earlier/65 she could 
prove her case through whatever means available given her unique 
situation.266 The law did not mandate production of specific pieces of 
257. GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 55-56 (citing John E. Snell et ai., The Wifebeater's 
Wife: A Study o/Family Interaction, 11 No.2 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY (1964)); 
see also GOODMAN & EpSTEIN, supra note 116, at 52; Natalie Shainess Vulnerability 
to Violence: Masochism as Process, 33 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 174, 178 (1979). 
258. See GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 58-59; LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED 
WOMAN passim (1979). 
259. See EDWARD W. GoNDOLF WITH ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: 
AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS passim (1988). 
260. GOODMAN & EpSTEIN, supra note 116, at 54; see also GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 
62. 
261. See SCHECHTER, supra note 10, at 108-09. 
262. See Kelly, supra note 253, at 575, 583, 585-86. 
263. See id. at 575. 
264. See id. 
265. See supra text accompanying note 207. 
266. See Petition to Classify Alien as Immediate Relative of a United States Citizen or as a 
Preference Immigrant; Self-Petitioning for Certain Battered or Abused Spouses and 
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evidence, understanding that survivors might have limited or no 
access to the family home or official documents.267 Regulations 
authorized use of secondary evidence that could be used as proof. 268 
This standard of proof was not always the rule, but was adopted 
only after an arduous advocacy campaign.269 The battered spouse 
waiver predated V A W A and provided the first protection for battered 
spouses.270 According to its terms, an applicant whose abuse had been 
in the form of extreme mental cruelty (and not physical abuse) was 
obligated to provide proof "supported by the evaluation of a [mental 
health] professional recognized by the [Immigration] Service as an 
expert in the field."271 The advocacy community strongly rejected 
this standard, criticizing that it was unfair to determine eligibility for 
the waiver based on how damaged the survivor was as a result of the 
mistreatment. 272 The only factor that should be relevant is whether or 
not the perpetrator's actions constituted abuse.273 Focusing instead 
on the victim's mental health validated a flawed premise. If a woman 
could withstand horrific emotional or psychological abuse without 
lasting damage, should the abuse no longer serve as a basis for 
relief?274 The terms of VTVP A 2000 corrected this flaw by ensuring 
that "any credible evidence" could be used to objectively prove that 
the abuse actually occurred.275 
Similarly, the self-petitioner was granted full autonomy to narrate 
her story in her own distinct voice. She could use the affidavit as one 
of the most central proofs in her application to convey her history in a 
way that most accurately depicted what happened.276 To satisfy the 
"battery or extreme cruelty" element of the self-petition, the applicant 
Children, 61 Fed. Reg. 59,13061, 59,13066 (Mar. 26, 1996) (codified at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.2 (1997». 
267. Id. at 59,13066; seeVAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701(a)(3), 108 Stat. at 1953-54. 
268. See Petition to Classify Alien as Immediate Relative of a United States Citizen or as a 
Preference Immigrant; Self-Petitioning for Certain Battered or Abused Spouses and 
Children, 61 Fed. Reg. 59,13066. 
269. Cj James A. Jones, Comment, The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments: Sham 
Marriages or Sham Legislation?, 24 FLA. U. L. REv. 679, 689-90 (1997). 
270. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
271. 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(iv) (1993). 
272. Jones, supra note 269, at 690. 
273. See id. 
274. Martha F. Davis & Janet M. Calvo, INS Interim Rule Diminishes Protection/or 
Abused Spouses and Children, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 665, 668 (1991). 
275. See VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1505(b), 114 Stat. at 1525 (codified as amended at INA 
§ 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(7)(B) (2006». 
276. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c) (2012). 
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need only establish that she endured abusive behavior. 277 This 
standard does not demand that she paint a picture of victimization. 
There was no need for classic recitations of traditional courtships, 
loving relationships turning abusive, cycles of violence, hopelessness, 
and finally, separation. Few survivors see themselves entirely as 
victims, devoid of choice or completely helpless in a marriage. Use 
of the affidavit allows a woman to explain her choices and to describe 
the history of the relationship in thoughtful, nuanced terms.278 The 
survivor's narrative may include mixed emotions of love and anger, 
self-defense, fighting back, ambivalence regarding the course of the 
relationship, confusion as to her role, family or cultural pressures, 
and fear about extricating herself from the relationship. 279 
Remarkably, VAWA officers are well-prepared for this complex 
challenge. All VA W A self-petitions are adjudicated by the staff of 
the USCIS Vermont Service Center, where a V A W A unit receives 
specialized training in the dynamics of domestic violence.28o The 
VA W A unit has been acknowledged for the quality of its application 
review.28I With few exceptions, if an adjudicator has doubt about the 
facts or if there are apparent inconsistencies, she will send the 
applicant a "request for evidence" giving her an opportunity to clarify 
or elaborate on the point in question.282 While the self-petition 
process cannot escape the confines of the family petitioning schema, 
which generally disadvantages women,283 it does give broad 
277. Id. § 204.2(c)(E)-{H). 
278. Ann Shallek, Theory And Experience In Constructing The Relationship Between 
Lawyer And Client: Representing Women Who Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REv. 
1019, 1025-26 (1997). Cf Espenoza, supra note 128, at 167; Kelly, supra note 146, 
at 696-99. 
279. Leigh Goodmark, When is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She 
Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 113-114 (2008). 
280. USCIS, REpORT ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT UNIT AT 
THE USCIS VERMONT SERVICE CENTER: REpORT TO CONGRESS " (Oct. 22, 2010) 
("Members of the V A W A Unit undergo rigorous initial training ... significantly more 
thorough and of greater duration than [other USCIS lines,] ... followed by a lengthy 
period of mentors hip of newer officers by more senior adjudicators."). 
281. Id. at 16. 
282. See USCIS, ADJUDICATOR'S FIELD MANUAL - REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION ch. 10.5 
(2012), online version available at http://www.uscis.gov/portaVsite/uscis/ 
menuitem.f6da51 a2342135be7 e9d 7 a 1 OeOdc91 aOl?vgnextoid=fa 7 e53 9dc4bedO 1 OV gn 
VCMIOOOOOOecdI90aRCRD&vgnextchannel=fa7e539dc4bedOl0VgnVCM1000000e 
cdI90aRCRD&CH=afm. 
283. Calvo, supra note 121, at 613-14 (concluding that while "[a]lien spouses of both 
sexes are theoretically subject to the law's spousal domination," women bear the 
greatest adverse impact because "the immigrants gaining status as spouses have been 
predominantly female," "[ w]ives have legally and socially been the historical target of 
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flexibility for the applicant to portray herself more fully than the 
stereotypical, helpless victim, without jeopardizing her case.284 
These protections were seriously challenged by the proposed House 
amendments to VA W A 2013, demanding the repeal of the any 
credible evidence standard, inclusion of the abuser's input and 
evidence, as well as a required professional assessment validating the 
physical or emotional harm. 285 
b. Ceding Control of the Process to Law Enforcement 
The regulations for the U visa represent a far departure from the 
independence granted to self-petitioners.286 The U visa provisions 
codify dependence of an immigrant survivor of domestic violence on 
law enforcement. Because the U visa grant is contingent upon of a 
victim's assistance to law enforcement agencies, police and 
prosecutors have full control of the legalization process at two critical 
junctures: first, in determining who is a victim in a domestic violence 
scenario, and second, in exercising discretion to issue the certificate 
and the follow up verification of helpfulness.287 Then, in spite of 
overcoming those obstacles, the regulations also require the victim to 
show that she was substantially harmed as a separate element. 288 
l. Determining Who Is a Victim 
When called to a domestic dispute, police are responsible for two 
competing functions: enforcement of the law, which often includes 
discovery of undocumented immigrants, and protection of victims, 
regardless of immigration status. When the police approach the 
subordination in marriage," and the majority of victims of spouse abuse are women); 
see supra notes 263-264 and accompanying text. 
284. Cf Alizabeth Newman, Bridging the Justice Gap: Building Community by 
Responding to Individual Need, 17 CLINICAL L. REv. 615, 628 (2011) (discussing the 
use of boilerplate documents blurring the uniqueness ofthe individual). 
285. See supra note 254. 
286. INA § IOI(a)(l5)(U)(i)(l)-{IV), 8 U.S.C. § I 10 I (a)(15)(U)(i)(I)-{IV) (2006); see also 
Jamie Rene Abrams, Legal Protections for an Invisible Population: An Eligibility and 
Impact Analysis of U Visa Protections for Immigrant Victims of Domestic Violence, 4 
MODERN AM. 26,27 (2008) (discussing petitioner eligibility requirements for a U visa 
which inherently require the petitioner to rely on certifications from other entities 
outside of the petitioner's control). 
287. INA § IOl(a)(15)(U)(i)(I), (III), 8 U.S.C. § I IOI(a)(15)(U)(i)(l), (III); see also 
Abrams, supra note 286, at 32-33; Leslye E. Orloff et ai, Battered Immigrant 
Women's Willingness to Callfor Help and Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 
43, 78-79 (2003). 
288. INA § 101(a)(\5)(U)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § IIOI(a)(15)(U)(i)(l); see also Abrams, supra 
note 286, at 27, 33. 
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scene of a domestic incident, they must distinguish who is the victim 
and who is the perpetrator. Even at best, law enforcement's response 
to an immigrant victim is informed by societal notions of race and 
gender, which dictate determinations of who is a legitimate victim. 289 
Many law enforcement officers recognize as victims only those who 
are innocent, passive, and under total control of her abuser. 290 Such a 
narrow understanding of domestic abuse can result in no action being 
taken, or possibly the arrest of the wrong person, or of both people. 
How the police interpret victimization when the victim is 
undocumented and the abuser has status varies greatly from one 
district to the next. 
Too often the police are met at the door by a savvy abuser who 
speaks English and with whom the police identify more readily than 
the immigrant partner.291 When the abuser's explanation seems 
plausible to the responding officers, many victims have reported that 
the police leave without interviewing the victim and without making 
a police report. 292 
At worst, outright xenophobia has led certain police precincts to 
simply neglect to protect immigrant crime victims or to refuse to 
make the new federal tools avai1ab1e.293 Some survivors attempt to 
file a police report and are turned away because the police did not 
witness the attack or because there is no interpreter available. 294 In 
many instances when a report is issued, it does not reflect the events 
as told by the survivor, but downp1ays the seriousness of the violence 
of the incident, making it unusable in proving the vio1ence.295 
289. See Ritchie, supra note 145, at 151. 
290. See Jayashri Srikantiah, Peifect Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in 
Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 157, 195 (2007). 
291. See MARGARET ABRAHAM, SPEAKING THE UNSPEAKABLE: MARITAL VIOLENCE AMONG 
SOUTH ASIAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 122 (2000). 
292. See Leslye E. Orloff et aI., Battered Immigrant Women's Willingness To Call for Help 
and Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 43,55 (2005). 
293. Jamie R. Abrams, The Dual Purposes of the U Visa Thwarted in a Legislative Duel, 
29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 373, 377 (2010). 
294. Leslye Orloff & Olivia Garcia, Dynamics of Domestic Violence Experienced by 
Immigrant Victims, in BREAKING BARRIERS: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO LEGAL RIGHTS 
AND RESOURCES FOR BATTERED IMMIGRANTS 1,3, 15 (2004). 
295. In one case managed by the author, the abuser attempted to stop the victim and their 
two toddlers from leaving in a car by smashing his car into them. The police report 
that followed spoke of verbal harassment. On file with author. 
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2. Issuance of the Helpfulness Certificate 
The VA W A statute makes the issuance of the law enforcement 
certificates completely discretionary, but requires it as the key piece 
of evidence in a case.296 Without the certificate, an applicant cannot 
apply for the U visa.297 As with any policing issues, districts vary 
greatly in how difficult it is for them to issue the certificates.298 Some 
districts outright refuse to even consider the issuance of the U 
certification.299 
Ineffective Autonomy Language 
Ironically, advocates lobbied heavily during the drafting of the U 
visa to distinguish it by having it controlled by the victim, not by law 
enforcement. 300 Authors carefully worded the provision to give 
victims maximum independence by making the certificate available 
at any stage of the process, even before prosecution, thus allowing 
the victim to freely come forward to participate.301 Law enforcement 
agencies are charged with certifying that the victim "'has been 
helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful' in the investigation 
or prosecution of criminal activity.,,302 The future-looking option was 
meant to give full agency to the victim by assuring her that she could 
come forward to speak out against her abuser without having to 
worry about her immigration status.303 If the victim chose to assist in 
296. INA § 101(a)(15)(U)(i)(III), 8 u.s.c. § 11D1(a)(15)(U)(i)(III) (2006); Ordonez 
Orosco v. Napolitano, 598 F.3d 222, 226-27 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
389 (2010). 
297. INA § 214(P)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(P)(1) (2006). 
298. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2011) (discussing the general 
nature of why discretion is afforded to government agents when dealing with the 
policing of immigration); 8 C.F.R. § 214. 14(a)(2), (b)(3) (2012). 
299. See Abrams, supra note 293, at 387. 
300. Memorandum from National Network on Behalf of Battered Immigrant Women, 
Implementing the U Visa (2001), available at http;llwww.legalmomenturn.orgiassets/ 
pdfs/wwwimplementing.pdf (noting their interpretation of the negotiated language to 
mean that "[a]lthough the new visa may bear some superficial similarities to S visas, 
one significant distinction is that the victim, not a prosecutor, is the applicant 
controlling the process"). The S visa requires that a potential applicant comply 
completely with requests for assistance to law enforcement agencies in drug cases as a 
prerequisite to law enforcement's application for the relief. See INA § 
1101(a)(15)(S),8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(S). 
301. See 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014, 53,019 (Sept. 17,2007). 
302. INA § 214(P)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(P)(l) (2006) (referencing INA 101(a)(15)(U)(iii), 8 
U.S.C.A. (a)(l5)(U)(iii)). 
303. See VTVPA, supra note 9, 114 Stat. at 1513(a)(1) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 
1101 (2006)); Micaela Schuneman, Note, Seven Years of Bad Luck: How the 
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the prosecution of her abuser, she could qualify for the U visa. 304 
Unfortunately, this did not turn out to be the case. In practice, law 
enforcement agencies have unchecked discretion if and when to sign 
the certificate, which directly determines whether or not an applicant 
can apply for relief. 305 Commonly prosecutors deny consideration of 
the certificates until the close of a trial, fearing the defense counsel 
will accuse the victim of ulterior motives in testifying to obtain 
immigration status. 306 This policy often prolongs the issuance of the 
certificate, and the applicant's ability to file and secure any stability 
for months or even years. 
Similarly, the language of the statute "investigation or prosecution" 
was meant to sever the determination of helpfulness from a district 
attorney's decision to prosecute and from the ultimate success of the 
case.307 An applicant should be issued a certificate if she provided 
helpful information to investigate a crime of domestic violence, even 
if the prosecution decided to charge the perpetrator with a different 
crime, declined to prosecute at all, or went to trial and lost the case. 
However, in making the waiver completely discretionary, the 
provisions leave "helpfulness" to be arbitrarily interpreted in different 
districts. 308 In verifying "helpfulness," a law enforcement agency 
confirms that a victim is deserving of the certification.309 If they do 
not deem the victim worthy, they can simply decline to issue the 
certificate.310 The applicant has little recourse.31\ 
The competing provisions in the early versions of V A W A 2013 
regarding the issuance of the law enforcement certificates highlighted 
Government's Delay in Issuing U- Visa Regulations Further Victimized Immigrant 
Crime Victims, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 465, 481 (2009). 
304. INA §§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii), 214(P)(1), 8 U.S.C. §§ 110 1 (a)(15)(U)(iii), 1184(P)(1) 
(2006). 
305. Ordonez Orosco v. Napolitano, 598 FJd 222, 226-27 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 389 (2010). 
306. Promoting U Visas With Local Officials, NAT'L IMMIGRANT FAMILY VIOLENCE INST., 
http://www.nifvi.org/Promoting%20U%20Visas%20with%20 Local%200fficials.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 11,2013). 
307. See 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,020 ("This rule does not require that the prosecution actually 
occur, since the statute only requires an alien victim to be helpful in the investigation 
or the prosecution of the criminal activity."); INA §§ 101(a)(15)(U)(i)(III), 214(P)(1), 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)15(u)(i)(III), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(P)(1». 
308. See Ordonez Orosco v. Napolitano, 598 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 389 (2010). 
309. See 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,020. 
310. See id.; see also Abrams, supra note 293, at 395 (outlining multiple ways in which 
departments have overstepped their authority). 
311. See 8 C.F.R. § 214. 14(b)(3) (2012). 
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the struggle for dependence/independence of the U visa applicant. 
The initial Senate version of VA W A, S 1925, included the 
consideration of secondary evidence of helpfulness in lieu of the law 
enforcement certificate.312 The House amendment, H.R. 4970 
diametrically countered this clause by expressly prohibiting issuance 
of the U visa absent the law enforcement certification.313 Neither 
amendment survived the final passage of the bill. 
Prolonged Dependence 
Worse still, the issuance of the certificate does not end law 
enforcement's control of the process. Even if the victim is successful 
in obtaining the U visa, her dependence continues.314 Three years 
after the U visa is approved the immigrant becomes eligible to apply 
for permanent status, and she must re-certify that in those three years 
she has not refused any further reasonable requests for assistance.315 
If she cannot do so, she can lose the U status and the opportunity 
afforded her through VA WA.316 
What is seen as a "reasonable" request to the victim may not be 
considered as such by law enforcement. In addition to the fear and 
distress any crime victim might face in choosing to assist in the 
prosecution of her attacker, immigrant survivors face added 
obstacles.317 Most survivors of domestic violence will express that 
312. S1925 §805(a), Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of2012. 
313. H.R. 4970 §802, Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of2012 (amending 
INA § 214(P)(1) (8 U.S.C. 1184(P)(1)) to read: "No application for a visa under 
section 101(a)(15)(U) may be granted unless accompanied by the certification as 
described in this paragraph"). 
314. See INA § 245(m)(l), 8 U.S.C. § I255(m)(I) (2006 & Supp. 2007-2011); DEPT. 
HOMELAND SECURITY, U VISA LAW ENFORCEMENT CERTIFICATION RESOURCE GUIDE 
FOR FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL AND TERRITORIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 4, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_u_visa_ certification _guide. pdf (last visited 
Jan. 11,2013). 
315. See INA § 245(m), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(m). 
316. See id.; DEPT. HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 314, at 4 (directing law enforcement 
agencies contact and inform USCIS of the victim's unreasonable refusal to provide 
assistance in the investigation or prosecution should this occur after the issuance of 
the initial certification). 
317. See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE & 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, EXTENT, NATURE, AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 49-54 (2000), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesIlnij/181867.pdf; Orloff & Kaguyutan, supra note 215, 
at 97-99, 133-35. 
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calling the police is a measure oflast resort.3\8 If they do so, it is to 
stop the violence, but it is not necessarily to have the abuser 
punished.3\9 For the immigrant community, an arrest means more 
than a tainted record or time served for the abuser-it may also mean 
deportation or removal. 320 If the abuser is the father of her children or 
the family breadwinner, a deportation would be a devastating loss for 
the victim and her family. Mothers are faced with an excruciating 
decision. Helping law enforcement to prosecute her partner may 
mean sacrificing him in order to obtain immigration status for herself 
and her children. 
In addition, many applicants face further fears of retaliation from 
their abusers.321 In some instances the abuser has legal immigration 
status and thus the power to unite the victim with her children living 
in her home country.322 Or to the contrary, some abusers know that 
their own deportation is imminent and therefore make threats to harm 
the woman's family members in the home country.323 Some women 
are aware or resentful of law enforcement's racially disparate 
treatment of minority communities, and may refuse to participate on 
that basis.324 None of these motivations may appear reasonable to the 
authorities. 
Expanding forms of acceptable evidence is an essential step in 
returning to the applicant some of the independence written into the 
original U visa, and it will make the protections more available to 
immigrant communities. As mentioned above, attempts to do so in 
VAWA 2013 were unsuccessful.325 
318. See TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 317, at 49-51. 
319. See Richard B. Felson et aI., Reasons for Reporting and Not Reporting Domestic 
Violence to the Police, 40 CRlMINOLOGY 617, 631 (2002). 
320. See INA § 237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (2006) (codifying domestic 
violence as an aggravated felony, which can be used to remove a legal permanent 
resident with a criminal conviction). 
321. See Karyl Alice Davis, Unlocking the Door by Giving Her the Key: A Comment on the 
Adequacy of the U-Visa as a Remedy, 56 ALA. L. REv. 557, 568-72 (2004). 
322. See Orloff & Kaguyutan, supra note 215, at 97-99, 133, 134-35; For Immigrant 
Women, CENTER FOR RELATIONSHIP ABUSE AWARENESS (2010), 
http://stoprelationshipabuse.orgifor-immigrant-womenl. 
323. See Linda Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors: Surviving the Beatings of 1996, II 
GEO. IMMIG. LJ. 303, 320-21 (1997); CENTER FOR RELATIONSHIP ABUSE AWARENESS, 
supra note 322. 
324. See Ritchie, supra note 145, at 140 (charging that until the experiences of women of 
color who are survivors of law enforcement violence are addressed in the dominant 
paradigms of police brutality and violence against women, their voices will remain 
largely unheard and their rights unvindicated). 
325. See supra notes 215 and 216. 
274 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
c. Returning to Harm-Based Victimhood 
The tenns of the U visa that condition relief to a victim based on a 
showing of substantial harm return us to the inequities of the past.326 
In applying for the U visa, the applicant must demonstrate that she 
has suffered "substantial physical or mental abuse" as a result of 
being a victim of an enumerated crime or substantially similar 
criminal activity.327 The harm is defined as "injury or harm to the 
victim's physical person, or hann to or impairment of the emotional 
or psychological soundness of the victim.,,328 Proving the harm is the 
applicant's burden.329 In detennining whether the abuse is 
substantial, USCIS will consider a variety of factors. 330 
This definition of harm harkens back to the problematic terms of 
the 1990 battered spouse waiver previously rejected. That standard 
initially required a mental health professional to document that a 
woman had suffered extreme cruelty.331 It incorrectly focused 
eligibility for relief on the hann sustained by the victim rather than 
the criminal behavior of the abuser. 332 Under the current construction 
of the U visa, objective proof of the abusive actions to which a victim 
had been subjected is not considered sufficient, and additional proof 
of subjective harm is required.333 For the same reasons that standard 
was rejected under the battered spouse waiver, maintaining this 
flawed measure in the U visa will lead to nonsensical conclusions 
whereby the weaker victim is favored for relief over the stronger 
survivor based on the same type of criminal activity. 334 As with the 
326. See INA § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101 (a)(l5)(U) (2006); infra notes 331-335 and 
accompanying text (discussing the problematic terms of the battered spouse waiver 
which conditioned relief based on the victim's showing of harm). 
327. See INA § 101 (a)(15)(U)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101 (a)(15)(U)(i)(I); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.14(c)(2)(i) (2012). 
328. 8 C.F.R. § 214. 14(a)(8); see also INA § 11 01 (a)(1 S)(U)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I). 
329. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(4). Note that it is the applicant's burden to show substantial 
harm; however, at times law enforcement has overstepped its bounds, making the 
decision to issue the certification contingent on their affirmative finding of substantial 
harm. Id.; see also supra notes 305-306 and accompanying text. 
330. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b)(1) (listing factors such as: "nature of the injury ... the severity 
of the perpetrator's conduct; the severity of the harm suffered; the duration of the 
infliction of the harm; and ... permanent or serious harm to the appearance, health, or 
physical or mental soundness"). 
331. See supra notes 270-274 and accompanying text. 
332. See supra notes 270-274 and accompanying text. 
333. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b)(1). 
334. See supra notes 270-278 and accompanying text. 
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battered spouse waiver, the qualifying abuse should stand on its own 
without the need for the survivor to have to emphasize on her 
victimization in order to qualify for relief. 335 
Once again, the best efforts of advocates successfully attained 
expanded protections for battered immigrant women. However, 
many of the statutory requirements and actual practices of the law 
enforcement partners directly conflict with the feminist principles at 
the heart of the women's movement. 336 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article is intended to contribute to an ongoing dialogue of 
reflective practitioners and advocates. As we work to utilize and 
strengthen protections for battered women, we must recognize that 
these laws do not reach the root causes of domestic violence and are 
thus incapable of eradicating domestic abuse.337 Criminal justice 
approaches are simply interim and limited responses to an ongoing 
crisis. Inattention to the interwoven, systemic causes for domestic 
violence prevents a productive understanding of the inequities in 
cultural, economic, and political institutions that combine to support 
violence against women, ethnic minority women, and immigrant 
women.338 Effective "public policy should reflect an integrated 
response that identifies and locates both the source of violence and 
support for such violence.,,339 Of course legal work and enforcement 
should be included in the panoply of approaches, but those 
approaches will be ineffective and even damaging as the exclusive 
tactics.340 In addition, we must strive to ensure that as we play our 
distinct roles in the struggle to end domestic violence, we are being 
faithful to the feminist principles of "autonomy, individual and 
335. See supra notes 270-278 and accompanying text. 
336. See infra Parts III-IV.A. 
337. See Coker, supra note 167, at 848-49. 
338. See ABRAHAM, supra note 2921, at 2. 
339. Miccio, supra note 1, at 323. 
340. Symposium, Battered Women & Feminist Lawmaking: Author Meets Readers, 
Elizabeth M Schneider, Christine Harrington, Sally Engle Merry, Renee Romkens & 
Marianne Wesson, 10 lL. & POL'y 313, 359-60 (2002) ("Criminalization as a 
solution in itself is a big problem ... [if the domestic violence it seeks to deter is] not 
linked to the larger issues of women's economic situation, gender socialization, sex 
segregation, reproduction, and women's subjugation within the family."). 
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systemic accountability, and safety.,,341 As Gandhi reminded us, "We 
always have control over the means, but not over the end.,,342 
341. Miccio, supra note 1, at 322 (asserting that "all policies that affect women survivors 
of male intimate violence should be passed through the prism of autonomy, individual 
and systemic accountability, and safety"). 
342. GANDHI'S EXPERIMENTS WITH TRUTH: ESSENTIAL WRITINGS BY AND ABOUT MAHATMA 
GANDHI 118 (Richard L. Johnson ed., 2006) (quoting Gandhi in Young India, 724). 
